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The objectives of this thesis are to 1) estimate the overall distributions of 
household characteristics, 2) estimate the overall distributions of access to savings and 
credit products, and 3) determine the relationship between household characteristics and 
access to savings and credit products from various formal, semi-formal, and informal 
institution types. The goal of this thesis is to provide a direction for future linkage 
banking programs by finding which household characteristics should be targeted by this 
type of program. Panel data published by World Bank from the Uganda National 
Household Survey (UNHS) collected in 2005/06 and the Uganda National Panel Survey 
(UNPS) in 2009/10 were used in the analysis. In this thesis the results of the 
questionnaire are used to estimate the overall distributions of household characteristics 
and access to savings and credit, and then chi-squared tests are used to find significant 
relationships between the household characteristics and access to financial products from 
a variety of formal, semi-formal, and informal institutions. 
The results show that there are significant differences in access to savings from 
formal institutions, credit unions, savings associations, microfinance institutions, savings 
and credit cooperative organizations, and informal savings groups by age, gender, marital 
status, and education of the household head; household size; rural or urban location of the 
household; type of shocks experienced by the household; type and value of assets; and 
main income source of the household. The results also show significant differences in 
access to credit from a bank, microfinance institution, credit union, savings and credit 





gender, and marital status of the household head; household size; rural or urban location 
of the household; type of shocks experienced by the household; asset value; and main 
source of household income. 
The results show that household characteristics have a significant effect on 
financial access in Uganda and suggest that rural households, households with less than 
six members, and those households whose heads are between the ages of 15-24, 65 or 
older, are female, not married, have little or no education, have lower asset value, or 
depend mainly on subsistence farming income are the households that are more 
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This thesis is a study on the relationship between financial access and household 
characteristics in Uganda. More specifically, we are looking at access to savings and 
credit by type of institution and the implications for linkage banking programs in Uganda. 
The study was based on panel data from the World Bank.  The data were collected from 
households in Uganda in 2005/06 and also in 2009/10. This first chapter of the thesis 
presents an overview of the financial sector in Uganda and a general background of the 
problem of financial exclusion in developing countries. The rest of the chapter discusses 
the problem statement, the purpose of this study and its significance, and an overview of 
the methodology.  
We define access as having a loan or owning a savings account. We do not use 
proximity to or availability of a bank branch alone to define access because there are 
other barriers to access for the rural poor. These barriers can include failure of the bank to 
target the rural poor market; inappropriate design of products or inappropriate fee 
structures that do not fit the needs of the rural poor; literacy requirements; lack of trust of 
the commercial bank on the part of rural poor households; and other psychological or 
cultural barriers. Under the assumption that a majority of rural poor households would 
use at least one type of financial product, if an appropriately designed product were made 
available to them, we define access as having a loan or owning a savings account. 
The banking sector in Uganda is divided into four tiers. The first three tiers are 





These are all considered to be formal financial institutions. Tier four institutions include a 
variety of semi-formal and informal institutions, including microfinance institutions 
(MFIs), savings and credit cooperative organizations  (SACCOs), non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and informal savings groups, which are not regulated by the Bank 
of Uganda (The SEEP Network, AMFIU, and Citi Foundations 2008).  
Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962 and remained politically 
unstable throughout the 1970s. The pace of financial sector development in Uganda was 
slow throughout the 1980s, but it has expanded rapidly since then. In 2003, the Ugandan 
government passed the MDI Act, which set a minimum capital requirement and other 
requirements for MFIs that wish to be licensed to accept deposits (Kalyango 2005). This 
prevents many MFIs from accepting deposits for on-lending (where one party borrows 
money to lend to another party), but it also serves to protect people from unscrupulous 
MFIs who intend to steal their clients’ deposits. The MDI Act applies in all cases except 
SACCOs, which are allowed to mobilize savings despite being unregulated, since they 
are member owned institutions. 
The commercialization and integration of the microfinance sector into the formal 
finance sector brought a shift of support of the government from formal MFIs to rural 
SACCOs. The Government of Uganda recognizes MFIs as being part of the formal 
financial sector (The SEEP Network, AMFIU, and Citi Foundation 2008). By 2006, the 
government pulled support from all MFIs except for SACCOs (The SEEP Network, 
AMFIU, and Citi Foundation 2008) and began the Rural Financial Services Program ‘one 





in 2010 there were 2,063 functional SACCOs and 1,085 of these were created by the 
government for the ‘one SACCO per sub-county’ policy (UBOS and MOFPED 2010). In 
2005, a census was conducted by the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic 
Development and the Financial Sector Deepening Project Uganda which showed only 
628 SACCOs active out of 1,278 (AMFIU and FSDU 2007). 
A study from Finscope Africa reports the following statistics measuring financial 
inclusion. In this study, availability of financial service is used as a proxy for access. As 
of 2009, 17% of Ugandans had access to tier one financial services (commercial banks), 
3% to tier two (credit institutions), 3% to tier three (MDIs), 3% to SACCOs, and 3% to 
MFIs. In 2009, 43% of Ugandans had access to informal financial services, up from 29% 
in 2006. This increase in access to informal finance reduced the percentage of Ugandans 
who were excluded to only 28%, compared with 43% in 2006. Uganda has a higher 
percent of clients in the informal sector than other African countries, and has the second 
lowest exclusion rate (when including semi-formal and informal sectors), the lowest 
being in South Africa (Finscope 2010). 
Uganda, like many developing countries, has struggled to provide financial 
services to the most poor. Kendall, Mylenko, and Ponce (2010) estimate that, in 
developed countries, 81% of adults have access to a bank and there are 3.2 accounts per 
adult. However, in developing countries only 28% of people have access to a bank and 
there are only about 0.9 accounts per adult. 
The poor need access to a variety of financial services such as deposit accounts, 





households with consumption smoothing and prevent income fluctuations (Akpandjar, 
Quartey, and Abor 2013). Research has shown that there is a large demand for deposit 
accounts, money transfer and payment services, and insurance products, and that these 
may be more beneficial for the rural poor than access to credit (Brau and Woller 2004, 
Nourse 2001, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Honohan 2009). It was discovered that 
microfinance borrowers often took a business loan and used it for other purposes, such as 
school fees, burial costs, and medical costs, demonstrating a demand for a wider variety 
of loan products, such as consumption and emergency loans (Chan and Lin 2013). In a 
study by Chan and Lin (2013), over 23% of respondents used their business loans for 
consumption purposes. 
Financial products in Uganda are offered by formal, semi-formal, and informal 
institutions. Formal institutions include commercial banks, credit institutions, and micro-
deposit taking institutions. Semi-formal institutions such as MFIs and SACCOs are 
subject to some reporting requirements but are not fully regulated as are the formal 
institutions. Informal institutions are unregulated (Johnson and Nino-Zarazua 2011), and 
can include moneylenders, employers, pawnbrokers, informal savings groups, friends, 
and family. The type of institution will vary by the needs of the customer and are 
presented here in order of most informal to most formal.  
The most informal of these (excluding borrowing from friends, family, and 
moneylenders) are savings groups, which come in a variety of forms. The model of 
savings group developed by the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere 





Association, and is the type referred to in this thesis, unless another type of savings group 
is specified. The Village Savings and Loan groups are self-selected groups of 15-30 
people who organize themselves for the purpose of saving and lending among 
themselves.  
Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations are widely available semi-formal 
financial institutions. As a result of the ‘One SACCO per sub-county’ policy, most 
people have access to SACCOs. These semi-formal institutions are common in rural 
areas and are more accessible than most formal institutions, but are often poorly 
managed. There are also unregulated MFIs present in towns and sometimes in more rural 
areas.  
The more formal financial institutions in Uganda include regulated MDIs, which 
are available in most urban and peri-urban settings and provide a safe place for clients to 
keep their savings in addition to offering credit, microinsurance, and money transfer 
services. Commercial banks provide deposit accounts and larger loans, typically at a 
lower interest rate than MFIs and SACCOs. The poor use a variety of products from 
formal, semi-formal, and informal institutions (Kendall, Mylenko, and Ponce 2010). 
The term ‘linkage banking’ can mean different things, but in the context of this 
thesis, it refers to the linkage of savings groups (VSLAs) to formal financial institutions 
(commercial banks). Linkage banking often involves an intermediary that links the rural 
poor to commercial bank products, such as an NGO or moneylender. Linkage banking 
programs are often designed to be demand-driven and savings-led, meaning that the 





before accessing loan products. These savings are often collected informally as part of a 
village savings group, before accessing bank services. 
The CARE linkage program in Uganda, which we use as an example throughout 
this thesis, is both demand-driven and savings-led. Another important component of the 
CARE linkage program is the financial literacy training they provide to the savings 
groups. Cole, Sampson, and Zia (2011) found that respondents with below-median 
financial literacy were 20% more likely to open a bank account within two months if they 
attended a financial literacy training session. If there is a relationship between a 
household’s propensity to save and their ability to access commercial bank services, it 
may provide evidence that savings-led programs, such as the CARE linkage banking 
program, are a good approach for connecting the rural poor to formal finance. 
Common challenges in the provision of financial services to the poor that will 
need to be addressed in the design of linkage programs include transportation costs, 
security of deposits in transit, and information asymmetries. Transportation costs and 
security issues could be solved by mobile banking services. This can include money 
transfers done by mobile phone, rural ATM machines, or using an intermediary, such as a 
shop owner, moneylender, or SACCO, who has an account with the formal financial 
institution and earns a commission for each transaction carried out. Some programs avoid 
high transportation cost in part by working with groups rather than individual 
participants. When a group opens and maintains an account, one or two group members 
can go to the branch to make withdrawals or deposits on the group’s behalf, dividing the 





Information asymmetries exist when the financial service provider does not have 
enough information about their prospective clients or when the clients do not have an 
understanding of how the financial institution operates. The CARE linkage banking 
program reduces information asymmetries by providing training to the institution on how 
to work with the rural poor, as well as providing training to the rural savings groups on 
how to appropriately manage an account with a formal bank.  
Microfinance was initially intended to serve the rural poor with business loans 
who, prior to microfinance, had no access to financial services. It was believed that 
village moneylenders were taking advantage of rural people by charging usurious rates 
due to rural households’ lack of other options for borrowing (Aleem 1985). Recent 
research has shown that the poorest households are not being served by microfinance, but 
rather the moderately poor are being served. In Uganda, only approximately 15% of 
microfinance customers were found to be among the poorest of the poor, as defined by 
the official poverty line for Uganda (Morduch 2006). This is believed to be due to a shift 
in focus of microfinance institutions to a profit making business rather than remaining 
focused on the social goal of alleviating poverty, which relies on subsidies (Armendariz 
and Morduch 2010).  
In 2008, the CARE linkage banking program began in Uganda, and research is 
showing an increase in formal financial usage (CARE International and UKAID 2013). 
While there are differing opinions among practitioners in the field on whether or not the 
rural poor should use formal financial products, many programs have attempted these 





linkage banking program has characteristics that differ from previous linkage banking 
programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, which, if successful, would provide a model of linkage 
banking that could inform other demand-driven and savings-led programs.  
This thesis is significant because it is necessary to identify which types of 
households are using which types of financial institutions for savings and credit products 
in order to target the appropriate population for linkage banking programs. This study can 
serve as a baseline for a more in depth study of the CARE linkage banking program. 
Linkage banking programs are important because commercial banks are now 
beginning to view the rural poor as their future clients (CARE International and UKAID 
2013). If that is the case, the commercial banks that start linkage efforts now will have a 
head start in expanding into this market compared to banks which are not willing to make 
the effort to recruit the rural poor as clients.  
The rural poor can benefit from commercial banks in a variety of ways. They can 
have a secure place to keep their savings, can have the ability to transfer money and make 
payments, and may gain access to loans in higher amounts and with better terms than 
currently available. Through personal observations from working with SACCOs and 
savings groups, it is apparent that people living in rural areas of Uganda often save 
money at home, in a locked box held by a member of their savings group, or at a 
SACCO, all of which are less secure than a deposit account at a commercial bank. 
Business loans from commercial banks are available in larger amounts and better terms 
than many other financial institutions and typically charge lower interest rates. Banks are 





income to repay and are more likely to offer monthly or lump sum repayment. Credit 
programs targeting the poor can begin with small loans and increase the amount as the 
borrower continues to repay loans successfully. These loans may be more beneficial to 
micro-entrepreneurs expanding their business than small loans from MFIs and savings 
groups, which often collect repayment every week, regardless of the borrower’s business 
cycle. 
There is no consensus among researchers on which financial institutions should 
be responsible for serving the rural poor. Many researchers believe that commercial 
banks are not able to meet the needs of the rural poor. For example, while Mookerjee and 
Kalipioni (2010) find that greater access to bank branches is good for the poor, they also 
conclude that barriers to banking services, such as high fees for opening a checking or 
savings account is detrimental. It is likely that not all rural poor want or need formal 
financial products. Many may be happy with being in a savings group and may never 
access any loans or insurance products from outside sources, while some may remain in 
the group and also access services from other institutions. Others may quit the group 
when they feel ready and able to access larger loans and some may never join a savings 
group, but rather go directly to an MFI or SACCO. Whether or not the majority of rural 
clients want or need formal products, they should be available to those who do need 
them. However, it can be argued that rural clients should not be pressured into using any 
financial services they do not wish to use.  
When organizations began working on linkage programs in the 1980s, Sub-





although they were often successful in Asian countries. The infrastructure and financial 
sector in Uganda have improved since the 1980s and savings-led linkage banking 
programs may now be more feasible.  
The overall objective of this research is to identify which household 
characteristics have the greatest effect on access to savings and credit products from a 
variety of institution types. Access is defined as owning a savings account or having a 
loan. After identifying the household characteristics most identified with access to 
savings and credit, this information can be used by organizations designing programs to 
connect savings group members with commercial bank products.  
We looked at distributions of household characteristics first and then used chi-
squared tests to find which household characteristics have a significant relationship with 
access to savings and credit from various types of financial institutions. Panel data 
published by World Bank from the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) 
collected in 2005/06 and the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS) in 2009/10, 
consisting of 3,123 households, are used in the analysis.  
The rest of this thesis will proceed as follows: Chapter 2 provides a review of the 
general microfinance literature and a review of previous linkage banking programs; 
Chapter 3 gives a more detailed description of the methodology used in this thesis; 









There is a large body of research about microfinance and financial inclusion in 
developing countries. This literature review presents an overview of microfinance 
literature as it relates to the shift in focus from microcredit only to financial inclusion, the 
potential effects of financial inclusion, financial access and usage, issues with loan 
diversion and over-indebtedness, demand for financial services, technological 
innovations in finance, and the importance of financial literacy. It provides an overview 
of linkage banking programs in developing countries and concludes by presenting 
CARE’s Banking on Change program in Uganda.   
 
3.1 History of microfinance 
 
 
While microfinance institutions provide savings, insurance, and loans, most 
efforts to formalize institutions have focused on enterprise loans (Brau and Woller 2004). 
This enterprise lending bias ignores the large, unfulfilled demand among the very poor 
for consumption and emergency loans (Woller 2002). It appears on the surface that 
informal businesses would need access only to credit for business and productive 
purposes. However, because business production, household consumption, and insurance 
needs are intertwined for the informal sector entrepreneur, other financial needs are 
equally important (Nourse 2001). Evidence indicates that the type of savings required by 
microfinance programs (often used as a guarantee for loan repayment and only accessible 





consumption, income smoothing, and emergency needs of households. Informal sector 
households need a diverse range of lending and savings products to meet all of these 
needs (Nourse 2001). According to Woller, microfinance institutions lacked a focus on 
the products that their clients want them to produce, and were focused on institutional 
needs rather than the needs of their clients. He argues that, in order to achieve the goal of 
poverty alleviation among the very poor, it is necessary to focus on the wants and needs 
of the client (Woller 2002).  
Many other financial products, including savings, can meet the needs of the poor. 
According to a study in Latin America, 
“Mobilizing savings from low-income clients seems to represent the lost 
opportunity of microfinance in Latin America. At the same time, retail 
banks in the last two to three years have opened millions of small deposit 
accounts in the same countries where microfinance institutions have added 
fewer than 200,000 new clients (Christen 2000).” 
At microfinance institutions that do offer voluntary savings, savers usually far exceed 
borrowers (Brau and Woller 2004).  
Microfinance institutions experience delinquency-driven desertion due to 
household shocks. These desertions could be prevented by the provision of financial 
services which allow a household to better manage risk, such as voluntary savings, a 
variety of loan products, and insurance. Insurance can reduce loan losses and prevent the 





thought to be a large demand for formal insurance among the poor (Brau and Woller 
2004).  
Although the focus of microfinance in the beginning was to serve the poorest 
households, it is now common for MFIs to serve a higher income clientele. While 
financial access may improve the livelihoods of the rural poor, a study in Ghana found 
that rural banks are providing financial services that meet the needs of the urban 
population and are neglecting the needs of the rural poor (Akpandjar, Quartey, and Abor 
2013). This is referred to as mission drift. 
 
3.2 Impact of financial inclusion on income inequality 
 
 
The recent trend in microfinance is to encourage deposits, transactions accounts, 
and microinsurance, in addition to loans, as tools for financial management in developing 
countries. Poverty and inequality in low income households could be influenced by 
formal access to deposit accounts, payment services, and risk-pooling (Honohan 2008). 
This move away from credit-only is in part due to the realization that credit may not be 
the most appropriate financial service for some households because many poor 
households do not have the opportunity to invest in economic activities that have a high 
return, as was originally believed. There is, in fact, demand among low-income 
households for deposit facilities, payment and money transfer services, microinsurance 
products, and financial literacy services, in addition to credit (Fernando 2007). 
Recent studies have found a link between financial access and income inequality. 





services is good for the poor, but that the high cost of opening a checking or savings 
account is detrimental in terms of income distribution. In a cross-country study that 
examined the Gini coefficient, the income share of the poor, and the percentage of the 
population living on less than $1 a day, Beck, Kunt, and Levine (2007) found that 
financial development reduces income inequality, has a disproportionately positive 
impact on the poor, and is strongly associated with poverty alleviation. This finding is 
reinforced by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Honohan (2009), who find similar results 
reported in a majority of cross-country regressions. Clarke, Xu, and Zou (2006) also find 
that financial development reduces income inequality.  
Fernando (2007) summarizes the potential results of financial exclusion as the 
following: reliance on self-savings or informal sources for financial needs, increased cost 
of government welfare programs, reduction in freedom of choice, low income and 
savings, low social development, persistent poverty, greater social and economic 
inequality, and social exclusion.  
A study in Ghana found that microfinance institutions are more innovative when 
it comes to loan products compared to savings and that credit unions are the only 
institutions that offer microinsurance. One reason given as to why MFIs prefer offering 
credit is the higher margin gained (although in Uganda, there are few MFIs that are able 
to offer savings due to government regulation). Savings could benefit MFIs by giving 
clients a way to repay their loans in cases where they would not otherwise be able to pay 





that MFIs invest more in research and development to provide appropriate 
microinsurance products for the poor (Dary 2013). 
 
3.3 Impact on GDP and economic growth 
 
 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2007) find that financial development is 
positively and significantly correlated with GDP per capita growth; Kendall, Mylenko, 
and Ponce (2010) find GDP per capita to be strongly positively correlated with all 
measures of financial inclusion in a cross-country study.  
Yang and Yi (2008) find a positive relationship between financial development 
and economic growth in Korea and Bittencourt (2012) finds the same in Latin America. 
Hassan et al. (2011) find a two-way causality between financial development and 
economic growth in many regions in a cross-country sample. However, they find in sub-
Saharan Africa that financial development causes economic growth, and not vice-versa.  
They point out that this result supports the hypothesis of previous studies that this 
relationship is common in developing countries due to the increasing demand for 
financial services (Hassan, Sanchez, and Yu 2011). 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Peria (2007) find that GDP is positively associated 
with the number of bank branches, ATMs, loans, and deposits, but negatively associated 
with the ratio of deposits to income (measured by the average size of deposits to GDP per 
capita). They also find that higher deposits per capita and geographic branch penetration 
(measured by the number of branches per 1,000 square kilometers) are positively 





were much lower than the median from data collected from 99 countries. Uganda falls in 
the lowest quintile for bank branches per capita, loan accounts per capita, and deposits 
per capita (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Peria 2007). 
 
3.4 Financial access and usage 
 
 
Estimates from a cross-country study suggest that only 19% of adults in 
developed countries remain unbanked, while about 2.7 billion, or 82%, of adults in 
developing countries remain unbanked. There are approximately 6.2 billion deposit 
accounts in the world, but in developing countries almost 70% of adults do not have 
access to a formal deposit account. In Uganda, fewer than 20% of households report 
having a savings account at a formal institution. Dividing the amount of accounts in each 
country by the number of adults gives estimates of 3.2 accounts per adult in developed 
countries and only 0.9 accounts per adult in developing countries (Kendall, Mylenko, and 
Ponce 2010).  
Research on financial access in Uganda by Johnson and Nino-Zarazua (2011) 
shows that those whose primary income is from pension, transfers, or farm work are more 
likely to be financially excluded overall, and significantly less likely to have access to 
formal finance, than those who own a business. The study also found that those in the age 
range 25-44 are more likely to be formally included than those 18-24 and over 45, and 
that there is no significant difference in exclusion between rural and urban areas. One 
explanation for this result may be the Ugandan government’s policy of ‘one SACCO per 





in the rural areas of Uganda and are the only informal financial institutions allowed to 
mobilize savings. Another explanation could be that there are many low-income 
households living in slums in the urban areas who are also excluded from formal 
financial services, which may also explain the finding that those in Central Uganda 
(excluding Kampala) are half as likely to be included and almost twice as likely to be 
excluded from formal financial services than those in Kampala. The study found the 
strongest factor related to formal financial inclusion to be access to secondary education. 
While Uganda does have universal primary education, far fewer Ugandans have access to 
secondary education. 
 
3.5 Voluntary exclusion (access VS. usage) 
 
 
Since there are as many people in developing countries who are not using 
financial services as there are using financial services in developed countries, we can 
operate under the assumption that exclusion is mostly involuntary. This assumption is 
reinforced by research demonstrating a demand for savings and by the fact that many 
poor people in developing countries are already using informal financial services 
(Johnson and Nino-Zarazua 2011). Kendall, Mylenko, and Ponce (2010) draw a similar 
conclusion and some research has gone deeper into explaining voluntary exclusion by 
discussing the psychological and social reasons that may cause people to self-exclude 
when they would otherwise use financial services. 
In addition to common reasons for voluntary exclusion, such as collateral, interest 





which also includes psycho-social issues as a reason for voluntary exclusion. Psycho-
social reasons for exclusion include illiteracy, perceived difficulty in accessing finance, 
religious or cultural beliefs or bias, lack of information or misinformation about the 
financial system, or lack of trust of financial institutions. 
In a recent study in Ghana, it was found that perceived difficulty in accessing 
finance has a statistically significant effect on voluntary exclusion, resulting in the 
tendency of the potential borrower to cite reasons related to collateral, interest rates, or 
transaction cost, when, in reality, these are not the reasons for exclusion. Financial 
knowledge is also statistically significant, with a greater knowledge corresponding to a 
lower likelihood of voluntary exclusion. The study, therefore, recommends extensive 
financial literacy programs and social mobilization at the grassroots level as an approach 
for reducing voluntary exclusion (Osei-Assibey 2010). 
 
3.6 Loan diversion and the shift toward consumption loans 
 
 
Chan and Lin (2013) find evidence in China of microenterprise loans being either 
fully or partially diverted for consumption purposes. They describe a situation where 
47% of farmers used their business loans for consumer demands such as their children’s 
education, medical care, food, housing, and weddings, demonstrating a clear demand for 
consumer loans. Karlan and Zinman (2009) find that microfinance loans work more 
broadly through household risk management and investment, rather than directly through 
the targeted microenterprise, and their results of an experiment in South Africa shows 





economic self-sufficiency, and some aspects of mental health (Karlan and Zinman 2010). 
In Ghana, expenses related to education and day-to-day consumption are found to be the 
main reasons for loan diversion to non-productive uses. Schicks (2014) recommends the 
introduction of products such as flexible, short-term consumption loans, savings accounts 
for education expenses, and emergency loans to meet this demand. Indeed, the demand 
for credit for consumption purposes may reflect a demand for more appropriate savings 





Although there is not a consensus on the definition of over-indebtedness for 
microfinance borrowers, common definitions usually include factors such as delinquency 
and default, which are risk factors from the perspective of the institution. More broad 
definitions include factors of client protection, such as the following definition from 
Schicks (2014):  
“A microfinance customer is over-indebted if he/she is continuously 
struggling to meet repayment deadlines and structurally has to make 
unduly high sacrifices related to his/her loan obligations.”  
Over-indebtedness can be caused by outside influences such as household shocks, 
by lender behavior, and by borrower behavior. The most significant ways that lender 
behavior increases the risk of over-indebtedness have been found to be a focus on 
marketing and growth, unsuitable product characteristics, or inappropriate lending 





payment and savings services may reach universality as economies develop, and point 
out that not everyone should qualify for credit, citing the sub-prime crisis in the United 
States as an example of the consequences of encouraging low-income households to 
borrow beyond their repayment capacity.  
MFIs initially believed that their loans were replacing borrowers’ informal credit 
sources, when, in fact, they are often adding to those sources and thus increasing the debt 
burden of the borrower. The demand for consumption and emergency loans discussed 
previously is evident in developing countries by the thriving business of moneylenders. 
Although moneylenders have been depicted as loan sharks who take advantage of the 
poor by charging extremely high interest rates, they actually provide a valuable service to 
those requiring quick money with flexible repayment terms (Brau and Woller 2004).  
Some research even suggests that MFIs increase the demand for moneylender credit (Jain 
and Mansuri 2003, Mallick 2009). This is thought to be due, in part, to the strict weekly 
repayment requirements of many MFIs, such that the repayments come due before 
project returns. In these cases, the borrower may choose to borrow from the MFI to fund 
the project and borrow from the moneylender to repay the MFI (Jain and Mansuri 2003). 
Morel et al. (forthcoming) find evidence of this in southwest Uganda, where 
moneylenders’ clients often borrow from them to repay an MFI loan.  
In the case of borrowers, the most important factors that contribute to over-
indebtedness are cognitive and psychological biases and sociological pressures, which 





may be prevented by promoting savings over credit or offering insurance with loans, 
echoing in part the claim by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Honohan above (Schicks 2014). 
 
3.8 Experiment with expanded access to savings 
 
 
In the first randomized experiment involving increased access to savings accounts 
rather than credit in Kenya, 87% of people who were offered a savings account accepted 
and 41% made at least two transactions within the first month of opening the account. 
This is in contrast to an experiment with credit, where less than 3% started a loan 
application. At the time of this savings account experiment, only 2.2% of respondents in 
the study had access to a formal savings account, with the main reasons reported as high 
opening fees and minimum balance requirements (similar results are found in Indonesia 
and India, where 37% of unbanked respondents in a household survey said they would 
open a bank account if the fees are halved and 58% would open an account if fees were 
eliminated (Cole, Sampson, and Zia 2011)). Results of this study show an increase in 
savings among women who work at the market as a result of the savings account, but no 
significant increase among men. The women increased savings in their accounts without 
decreasing other forms of saving, such as livestock and informal savings group deposits. 
They also found that consumption increased, especially food consumption, and that 
participants increased the amount invested in their business by about 60% (Dupas and 
Robinson 2009). 
Dupas and Robinson discuss three potential reasons why the women in their study 





back into their business. First, the amount a woman was able to save at one time was 
often not enough to purchase inputs, so it was necessary for them to save in small 
increments over time. Second, the income for their business may not be consistent over 
time, creating an intermittent need for cash. And third, in the case of a household shock, 
it may be preferable to have the more liquid cash savings, compared to working capital, 
which may be difficult to liquidate in an emergency. They also find two main reasons 
why the women were not able to save enough without a formal account. Keeping savings 
at home makes it difficult to resist temptation to spend, and secondly, there may be social 
pressure to lend the cash to neighbors, relatives, or husbands, making the less accessible 
formal savings account preferable to saving at home (Dupas and Robinson 2009).  
 
3.9 Demand for risk management tools 
 
 
For many poor households, credit is not the primary financial service they need. 
Savings, payment services, remittances, and microinsurance products may be more 
important (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Honohan 2009). As of 2007, Uganda had the 
second highest number of donor-funded microinsurance projects in the world with over 
1.6 million Ugandans covered by loan-linked insurance products. These loan-linked 
products grew in popularity as they were offered by an increasing number of MFIs, and 
borrowers expected the microinsurance product to accompany their loan. The downside 
to the loan-linked model is that individuals have to take a loan to be insured. Opportunity 





Uganda. Cell phones can be used to pay premiums, submit claims, and pay claims (Roth, 
McCord, and Liber 2007).  
Evidence from El Salvador suggests that, while remittances have a positive 
impact on use of deposit accounts, there is no significant impact on the demand for credit 
from formal institutions. Receiving remittances increased the probability of a household 
using a deposit account by 11 percentage points, possibly due to the necessity of a safe 
place to keep remittance payments. The latter effect may be due to a reduced demand for 
credit if the remittances represent a substitute for credit (Anzoategui, Demirguc-Kunt, 
and Peria 2014). 
 
3.10 Technological and other innovations in rural finance 
 
 
Innovation in financial service delivery could make it easier to connect rural 
households to formal institutions and technology will play an important role in the future 
growth of financial access. Technology to reduce costs and innovative distribution 
channels have been identified as the most effective risk management tools in Kenya 
(Njuguna 2013). More access to ATMs and other point of sales devices and advances in 
communication technology, such as low cost cell phones, will reduce transaction costs 
and increase efficiency in the delivery of financial services in rural areas (Fernando 
2007). However, technological innovations can be challenging to market to rural 
households in developing countries. 
A study in Taiwan found that trust plays an important role in mobile banking 





can also refer to a mobile banking unit, which is a group of bank staff sent from a bank 
branch to the rural area to serve clients. In this case, mobile banking refers to the former. 
The study measured a number of factors that could potentially contribute to a person’s 
choice of adopting or not adopting mobile banking and found all but one to be significant. 
The significant factors include perceived relative advantage, perceived ease of use, 
perceived compatibility, perceived competence of the mobile banking system and those 
operating the system, and perceived integrity of those operating the system. The study 
also suggests that perceived competence has a significantly greater effect for first-time 
customers compared to repeat customers, demonstrating the importance of trust in 
expanding technological innovations in financial services (Lin 2011).  
Other innovations in rural finance include establishing credit registries or issuing 
personal identification numbers to establish credit histories; reducing the costs of 
registering and repossessing collateral; or introducing legislation to support financial 
technology such as leasing, electronic finance, and mobile finance (Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Honohan (2009). Personal identification systems and public credit registers can 
be innovative in developing countries in the sense that they can prevent financial 
institutions from lending to risky borrowers and prevent poor borrowers from taking 
multiple loans to repay other loans when it would cause them to become over-indebted. 
While some rural borrowers may be able to successfully manage multiple loans, that is 
not true of all borrowers and over-indebtedness has been blamed for 80 suicides in one 
year in India (Tharoor 2011). Many developing countries, such as Uganda, have no 





identification systems and find that the result of this system has a positive effect on 
financial intermediation and access.  
More specifically, research has shown that bank lending to the private sector is 
greater, and the credit risk lower, in countries with a more established information 
sharing system. This is due, in part, to the increase of information that banks have about 
borrowers’ characteristics and default history, which improves the prediction of the 
probability of repayment. It is also due to the increased incentive of borrowers to repay 
by making their credit history available to other potential lenders. In addition, 
information sharing can also lower interest rates by forcing banks to compete for clients 
(Japelli and Pagano 2002).  
The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), formed in 2009, is in the 
process of rolling out a program that will assign a unique identification number to all 
Indian residents, in addition to biometric technology that will identify finger prints and 
iris scans. Six hundred million people have signed up for the program and 560 million 
have been assigned an identification number. There are 58 million bank accounts linked 
to a UIDAI number, compared with two million a year ago, and UIDAI projects that 150 
million bank accounts will be linked by the end of 2014. The system made it easier for 
rural Indians to open a bank account when the Reserve Bank of India began allowing 
finger print identification in place of government documentation, and the Committee on 
Comprehensive Financial Services for Small Businesses and Low Income Households is 







3.11 Financial literacy 
 
 
The importance of financial literacy among the rural poor has been widely 
discussed due to the belief that limited financial literacy is a crucial barrier to demand for 
financial products and services. It is true that if individuals are not familiar with a product 
they are not likely to demand that product (Cole, Sampson, and Zia 2011).  From a 
household survey in Indonesia and India, Cole, Sampson, and Zia (2011) find that 
financial literacy is a strong and consistent indicator of demand for financial services. 
Lack of knowledge of how banks work was the second most common reason reported by 
households for not having a bank account. While only 31% of respondents reported 
knowing the requirements for opening a bank account, 74% expressed interest in 
attending a free financial literacy training session. 
Akpandjar, Quartey, and Abor (2013) included six financial literacy questions on 
their survey in Ghana, from which they calculate a financial literacy score. They found 
that, among rural households, a unit increase in the financial literacy score increased the 
probability to demand financial services by 9%. A different study in Ghana concludes 
that increasing borrowers’ financial literacy, and more specifically, debt related literacy, 
may decrease the risk of over-indebtedness. Their results indicate that an infinitesimally 
small increase in a borrowers debt literacy score corresponds with a 0.2% lower 
likelihood of over-indebtedness (Schicks 2014). 
Financial literacy programs are widespread in both developed and developing 
countries. The role of financial literacy training in developing countries may be crucial to 





previously. However, those offering the training should take great care in understanding 
the social and cultural setting in which they are operating, so that the training is designed 
to align with social and cultural norms. Moreover, financial literacy training of citizens 
should never be a replacement for good government policy as it relates to finance (Guerin 
2012). 
 
3.12 A Brief History of Linkage Banking 
 
 
Banks and MFIs opened in rural areas, in part, to provide affordable credit, and 
moneylenders were often viewed as usurious. Research has shown that moneylenders’ 
cost of lending is high and the high interest rate may reflect the cost of lending to high 
risk borrowers (Aleem 1990). More recently, researchers are starting to explore the 
potential of moneylenders as linkage partners in formal financial services delivery. 
Varghese (2005) proposes a linkage between banks and moneylenders in rural 
India. In the proposed model, borrowers would take a loan from the moneylender, who 
will then repay the bank. Where the bank would choose not to lend for a project with a 
high expected return due to lack of information, the moneylender would have access to 
that information and choose to lend. When comparing the linkage model to a model with 
bank competition or a monopoly bank, the model is found to improve on both in terms of 
borrower and social welfare by increasing the bank’s lending space (Varghese 2005). 
However, a linkage program does not need to be strictly between a bank and 
moneylender. Many linkages exist between banks and agriculture extension agents, 





The Eastern Corridor Livelihood Security Promotion Program (ECLSPP) in 
Ghana serves as an example of how an NGO can act as a financial linkage partner. The 
SEND Foundation helped establish credit unions which are community member-owned 
financial cooperatives. Because economically-active, low-income women often do not 
meet the financial requirements to join the credit union, a second program was 
established to work with the women until they are able to join. This part of the program 
helps women form solidarity groups which can access credit union loans subsidized by 
SEND Foundation to help them grow their businesses until they are able to join the credit 
union. As of 2012, 2,420 women had opened an account at the credit union, compared 
with 279 at the end of 2009 (O’Brien and Haruna 2013). 
Other results of ECLSPP from interviews conducted by O’Brien and Haruna in 
2011 and 2012 include the following: the percentage of women expanding their business 
increased from 30% to 49%; the percentage of women saving money increased from 24% 
to 40%; the percentage of women contributing to their household expenditure increased 
from 12% to 45%; the percentage of women contributing to household decisions 
increased from 36% to 54%; the percentage of women with business skills increased 
from 42% to 56%; and the percentage of women involved in leadership matters increased 
from 20% to 46%. 
As in Uganda, NGOs and NGO-MFIs in Ghana cannot collect deposits from the 
public, but they can train community cooperatives, such as savings groups and credit 
unions, to manage their own finances. The NGO partner can offer a variety of other 





credit union board members for ECLSPP, and also offered non-financial services, 
including reproductive health and HIV/AIDS education, enterprise development support, 
and mentoring support. The NGO-MFI in this case recognizes the importance of 
relationships with other partners, mentioning MFIs, banks, and business development 
organizations, among others, as potential linkage partners (O’Brien and Haruna 2013).  
The remainder of this section is a brief review of linkage banking projects in Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa, followed by a summary of the CARE linkage banking 
program currently operating in ten districts in Uganda.  
 
3.12.1 Formal deposit account linkages in Mexico 1992 (Aportela 1999) 
 
 
Because low-income households often use savings for emergencies and 
unexpected investment opportunities, liquidity may be more important to them than 
interest rates. A paper assessing the impact of increasing financial access on savings in 
Mexico by studying the effects of two formal savings products finds this to be true. One 
program required monthly compulsory deposits and clients could not access their savings 
before a maturity date of either 12, 24, or 36 months. The second program requires a 50 
peso minimum balance, but has no compulsory savings requirement, and offers a slightly 
lower interest rate than program one. Both programs charge no fees. The second program 
was found to be more popular, showing a preference for liquidity. The study also found 
that the expansion of these formal savings programs in 1993 increased the average 
savings rate of participating households by three to five percent and that the effect was 





3.12.2 Savings group/bank linkage in Tajikistan, 2009 (Ledgerwood and Wilson 2013) 
 
 
In 2009, the Mountain Societies Development Support Programme (MSDSP, 
created by the Aga Khan Foundation) initiated the Community-Based Savings Group 
Program (CBSG), modeled after savings groups in Africa and South Asia. The model 
consists of bi-weekly meetings where members contribute deposits which they lend out to 
members, usually at 3% interest. By the end of 2012, average savings per member was 
$50 and some CBSGs had accumulated so much capital that MSDSP began linking them 
with a local bank to deposit excess savings. Ledgerwood and Wilson conclude by 
discussing the importance of involving a variety of financial service providers that 
include both community-based and formal institutions. The CBSGs ability to accumulate 
enough capital from frequent, but small, contributions represents an approach which can 
be recreated by stakeholders everywhere to increase financial inclusion (Ledgerwood and 
Wilson 2013). 
 
3.12.3 Self-help group/formal bank linkage in Indonesia and India, 1988 and 1992 
(Seibel 2007, unless otherwise specified) 
 
One of the earlier attempts at linking informal savings groups and banks was 
initially developed in Africa, but after finding that the policy environment was not 
conducive to the program, it was attempted in Asia instead. This program included the 
following elements: building on the existing formal and informal financial infrastructure; 
savings-based credit linkages of self-help groups (SHGs) with banks; informal groups 





models of cooperation between SHGs, NGOs, and banks as autonomous business 
partners, each with its own interest rate margin to cover its transaction costs. The first 
program was rolled out in Indonesia in 1988, and ten years later, 800 rural banks and 
16,000 SHGs were involved. 
However, this model found the greatest success in India, where the National Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) started a highly successful pilot 
program in 1992. NABARD also used the existing infrastructure of SHGs and formal 
banks, made the program savings-led rather than credit-led, used banks for credit 
provision rather than donor supported organizations, and allowed the rural poor to have a 
say in the design of the program. NGOs played a big role in the program, helping the 
rural poor organize into SHGs and helping the SHGs learn how to function properly.  
At the end of a four year pilot period, almost 5,000 SHGs with 80,000 members 
had been linked to 80 banks. The program was found to be working well for very poor 
women, especially those living in resource-poor areas. Income and savings had both 
increased, even for the poorest, while transaction costs decreased for both the banks and 
the SHGs. The participants in the program had a repayment rate of almost 100%, in 
contrast with the 50%-60% repayment rate normally found in agricultural credit. By 
2005, the program had reached 1.6 million informal savings groups and SHGs, with 
3,000 governmental institutions and NGOs facilitating the start of SHGs and connecting 
those SHGs to 35,000 bank branches (Seibel 2007).  
A separate paper by Sangeeta, Arora, and Meenu (2012) finds that all public 





services including savings, credit, and microinsurance. Interestingly, the banks lend to 
individuals, SHGs, or both, but prefer individuals, citing a lack of trust between SHG 
members. The authors recommend that bankers work with NGOs to prevent this problem, 
which suggests that some banks may not be taking advantage of NGOs knowledge and 
information advantage regarding SHGs. Interviews with bankers revealed that 62% of 
banks have repayment rates of over 90% in the microfinance sector and the other 38% 
have repayment rates between 60% and 90%, indicating that it can be worthwhile for 
commercial banks to lend to the poor when adequate funds are provided at appropriate 
times to coincide with their business cycle (Sangeeta, Arora, and Meenu 2012).   
 
3.12.4 Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Burkina Faso (Seibel 1999) 
 
 
As mentioned in the previous linkage example, one of the first linkage models 
was originally developed in Africa in the 1980s before being implemented in Asia. 
Despite the fact that Africa was not prepared to support a linkage banking program at that 
time, a project in Eastern Nigeria was started as a result of the development of this model. 
The linkage project, coordinated by Central Bank of Nigeria, resulted in 313 groups 
linked to 54 bank branches. While banks in Nigeria were being forced to lend to rural 
clients through compulsory rural lending (at the time of this program only; compulsory 
lending is no longer a policy in Nigeria), they do recognize this linkage model to be more 
effective and efficient than other approaches.  
Linkage projects followed in Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso. The Zimbabwe 





retail lending through more than 1,000 SHGs. AFC saw repayment rates increase from 
50% to 86% and expected further improvements. They began partnering with NGOs to 
provide guidance, consulting, and support to groups. The Burkina Faso program was 
initiated by Caisse Nationale du Credit Agricole (CNCA), which identified 185 groups 
for pilot-testing in 1993. CNCA collected savings deposits as collateral and then 
refinanced the groups as autonomous financial intermediaries who would then on-lend to 
their own members. This program also saw improvements in the repayment rate and 
resulted in 50% of CNCA’s loan portfolio represented by village groups and 
cooperatives. 
 
3.12.5 Tontine/commercial bank linkage in Senegal (Aliber 2002) 
 
 
 Experiments in West Africa in the 1980s attempted to link savings groups to 
commercial banks (Aliber 2002). An attempt to link Tontines (a type of savings group in 
West Africa) to commercial banks in Senegal showed that commercial banks were not 
prepared to make the necessary adjustments and innovations to deliver financial services 
on a small scale at low cost. Another study of this program showed that tontines were not 
able to keep the minimum deposit required by the bank and that the tontines were not 
satisfied with the length of time it took to access their money from the bank (Balkenhol 
and Gueye 1994). Minimum deposit requirements are often cited as a barrier to access, 
and offering a deposit account with no minimum deposit requirement is one adjustment 







3.12.6 Self-help group/bank linkage in South Africa (Schoombee 1999) 
 
 
Schoombee (1999) discusses the following four types of linkages in South Africa: 
Model 1: This is the most common model, where banks lend to an NGO, which then 
lends the funds to the self-help group. 
Model 2: Linking self-help groups directly to banks, with the help of an NGO. The NGO 
helps the bank by forming new self-help groups to potentially link to the bank and by 
advising the bank on SHG performance. 
Model 3: Linking individual members of an SHG to the bank, with NGO and SHG 
involvement. This model should only be used following the successful implementation of 
model two. 
Model 4: Linking SHGs and banks directly with no NGO involvement. 
The models were ranked by bank transaction costs as a percentage of loans and by 
repayment rates, with model two ranking best by both measures. Model two had 
transaction costs at 2.19% of loans and a repayment rate of 97%. Model four failed, likely 
due to the inability of the bank to identify borrowers, demonstrating the importance of 
NGO involvement. The NGO is typically closer to the prospective borrowers than the 
bank, and therefore, the NGO will do a better job identifying borrowers.  
Schoombee (1999) offers recommendations regarding some common challenges 
of bank linkage programs. The bank should keep in mind that SHGs and informal savings 
groups are based on trust and reciprocity and avoid measures that will interfere with 
group cohesion, such as arbitrarily adding members to an existing group. Regarding the 





covering rates of interest, while accepting that lending to this market will be more costly 
than lending to average bank customers.  
There is a real need for formal bank services for micro-entrepreneurs in South 
Africa and the linkage banking model is the best option due to its higher likelihood to be 
profitable, compared with other models. The high risk and costs associated with 
borrowing to this market is taken from the bank and is the responsibility of the NGO, 
which has an advantage of information access, close proximity, and knowledge of the 
rural market (Schoombee 1999). 
 
3.12.7 Stokvel/commercial bank linkage in South Africa (Verhoef 2001, unless otherwise 
noted) 
  
A number of commercial banks in South Africa introduced savings accounts for 
savings groups in the late 1980s to mid 1990s, although most of these programs have 
been discontinued (Aliber 2002). The savings groups, called stokvels, started in the 1930s 
and continued to grow in both popularity and number. By 1988, a stokvel umbrella 
organization was established (NASASA) and by 1993 it was estimated that almost 280 
million Rand in stokvel savings was invested in commercial banks. NASASA argued that 
there was also demand for loan products, which resulted in commercial bank offerings of 
loan products and burial insurance, in addition to savings accounts to stokvels, which 
were met with mixed success. 
 The first three savings products developed for stokvels were offered by three 





fee, no minimum balance, and few or no fees. The first loan product offered to stokvels, 
the People’s Benefit Scheme, was created by a partnership between First National Bank 
and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. However, by 1995, both partners 
withdrew from the product due to lack of demand, which is believed to be due to lack of 
trust in banks on the part of stokvel members. The failure of this program reinforces the 
idea that a program offering formal financial services to the poor should be both savings-
led and demand-driven.  
 In addition to the savings and credit programs, a funeral insurance product was 
introduced for the stokvels and was found to be quite successful (Verhoef 2001). 
 
3.13 CARE linkage banking program 
 
 
The following is a summary of CARE’s Banking on Change program in Uganda. 
All information from this section is from “Connecting the World’s Poorest People to the 
Global Economy: New Models for Linking Savings Groups to Formal Financial 
Services” from CARE International and UKAID (2013), unless otherwise specified. 
 
3.13.1 Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA) 
 
 
CARE’s Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) program is one of the 
world’s most effective community savings group programs. It allows members to save, 
access small loans, and build up their own small insurance fund for emergencies. Since 
its beginning in 1991, the VSLA program has reached over three million people in 26 





The basic principle is that a self-selected group of people come together to form a 
VSLA and become members. They save money each week in the form of shares and then 
use the savings fund they accumulate to finance loans to each other at an interest rate 
decided on by the VSLA members. The insurance fund can provide small, interest-free, 
short term loans for emergencies. At the end of an agreed upon period of time, the group 
will share out the accumulated savings and interest to its members and begin another 
savings cycle.  
The VSLA methodology relies on a carefully structured system of training. The 
group is assisted in their initial formation, election of group officials, and agreement on 
group mechanisms such as amount of weekly savings, interest rate, loan terms, and 
insurance fund. After this initial training, the group is supervised by CARE or another 
implementing partner organization. One critical success factor of CARE’s VSLA 
program is the ability for communities to manage the VSLA independently. A study in 
Zanzibar in 2006 showed that, of 25 VSLA groups, all but one continued to operate 
independently more than six years after CARE withdrew direct support.   
As groups mature, they may outgrow the savings group model and express 
interest in accessing financial products from external institutions. Many members, after 
accumulating a large savings, desire the security provided by a bank account, while 











3.13.2 Linkage banking program 
 
 
“CARE has called elsewhere for a global push to expand access to 
financial services for the poor, including through policy changes that 
promote financial literacy training and amend national regulatory 
frameworks to encourage the use of savings groups as a springboard to 
financial inclusion. Whether such clusters of “ready-made customers” 
offer a commercially viable market for providers is not yet clear, but 
initial results offer hope that, with mobile banking, sustainable models are 
within reach.” 
 
Savings and credit product in partnership with Barclays 
 
 
CARE has rolled out eight pilot initiatives in five African countries beginning in 
2008, two of which were rolled out in Uganda. One of these is part of the Banking on 
Change partnership between CARE, Barclays, and Plan International. The process of 
designing an appropriate program involved identifying suitable groups by using CARE’s 
Linkage Readiness Assessment Tool, briefing bank staff on working with savings groups, 
and training savings group members on using financial services and, more specifically, 
the Barclays product.  
After a needs assessment, CARE and Barclays decided to start with savings 
accounts rather than credit. The product offered is a group current account with no 





was exceeded, with over 400 groups opening an account with Barclays and deposits of 
almost $120,000 by the end of September 2012. 
After building trust, the group members started requesting access to credit and 
Barclays Uganda offered a credit product targeted at savings groups. The product is an 
overdraft facility allowing customers to borrow only the amount they need rather than 
pre-determined fixed loan amounts. The product is available only to groups who already 
use a savings account and is viewed as complementary to the savings account, rather than 
a replacement. This product was also accompanied by extensive financial literacy training 
from CARE. 
The main challenge in connecting future groups to this program is distance to the 
bank branch. Barclays is exploring the potential of mobile banking to expand outreach to 
these groups.  
 
Funeral insurance product in partnership with Jubilee Insurance 
 
 
In 2009, CARE conducted a needs assessment among savings groups in Uganda 
to determine their most wanted financial service and found that the top priority was 
funeral insurance. The initial pilot failed after the implementing partner realized they set 
the premium too low to be viable and pulled out of the program.  
The second attempt at offering funeral insurance is in partnership with Jubilee 
Insurance and has been more successful. The product covers pre-existing conditions for 





$3.15 per year in the initial pilot). Despite the price increase, the product continued to 
sell.  
One customer noted that when her husband died, she was able to cover the cost of 
the funeral without selling her land, which she would have otherwise had to do in the 
absence of the Jubilee Insurance product. CARE also believes that the product could have 
benefits beyond simply covering the cost of the funeral. A study in 2011 showed that 
insured group members are more likely to invest their savings in productive activities 
than those who are uninsured. The argument is that group members feel safer knowing 
that the funeral expenses will be covered and therefore do not feel as compelled to keep 
their savings in cash. Since this is only a pilot project in its early stages, future research 
would need to be conducted to measure this potential effect. 
 
3.13.3 Scaling up 
 
 
Barclays has found that savings groups can provide enough business to become 
financially viable at some bank branches and is beginning to view them as their 
“individual clients of the future.” One surprising outcome of the pilot projects is the 
demand for individual savings accounts, which has prompted Barclays to offer these 
accounts to a large number of its VSLA clients.   
“According to Michael Kaddu, Head of Corporate Affairs at Barclays in 
Uganda, the partnership with CARE started as a largely philanthropic 





Despite positive outcomes, some key challenges remain. These include distance to 
the bank branch, the risk of cash in transit, limited knowledge of savings groups from 
bank staff, limited knowledge of commercial banks from savings group members, low 
literacy levels among savings group members, and the relatively large amount of time it 
takes bank staff to work with rural clients. Many of these challenges could be met, in 
part, with appropriate training and the increasing use of mobile banking. 
This savings-led and demand-driven program from CARE aims to meet the 
demand for savings and insurance products by connecting the rural poor to commercial 
financial service providers. The potential to serve Uganda’s poorest households by 
providing the appropriate training, support, and a variety of financial and risk 
management tools should not be ignored, as it could lift these households out of poverty. 
These are households who may otherwise go completely un-served by MFIs, as many of 
them are not entrepreneurs, but subsistence farmers.  
The success of the linkage banking programs discussed above and the potential to 
learn from their shortcomings provides hope that NGO-commercial bank linkages can 
have a real impact on the lives of the rural poor. Lessons that can be taken from these 
programs are the importance of financial literacy training for savings groups to prepare 
them for formal financial access; the use of an NGO as a linkage partner to provide 
information and training to bank staff and identify potential bank clients; the clients’ 
preference for the liquidity provided by voluntary rather than compulsory savings; the 





reduce barriers to entry; and the ability of the rural poor to accumulate capital by 
contributing small savings deposits over time through membership in a VSLA.   
Although these models had limited success in African countries in the 1980s, 
most countries have since experienced financial sector liberalization, and the same 
program that did not work in the 1980s may be very successful today. This, along with 
technological innovations that continue to reduce transaction costs in rural financial 
service delivery, may provide the appropriate climate for universal financial inclusion. If 
the CARE program in Uganda continues to be successful, it will provide a blueprint for 









The objectives of this thesis are to 1) estimate the overall distributions of 
household characteristics, 2) estimate the overall distributions of access to savings and 
credit products, and 3) determine the relationship between household characteristics and 
access to savings and credit products from various institution types. Institutions can be 
formal (banks, micro-deposit taking institutions, government agencies, or credit 
institutions), semi-formal (microfinance institutions (MFIs), credit unions, savings and 
credit cooperatives (SACCOs), or NGOs), or informal (informal savings groups, 
relatives, friends, or moneylenders). Objectives 1 and 2 were carried out to better 
understand the survey and sample before observing the relationships in objective 3. This 
chapter will present and discuss the research context, the survey instruments, procedures 
used in data collection, and the data analysis.  
There are programs in Uganda that attempt to connect the rural poor to formal 
finance by first mobilizing them into savings groups to accumulate capital, providing 
financial literacy training, and then connecting them to formal banks. The goal of this 
thesis is to provide a direction for future linkage banking programs by finding which 
characteristics should be targeted by this type of program.  
Panel data published by World Bank from the Uganda National Household 
Survey (UNHS) collected in 2005/06 and the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS) in 
2009/10 are used in the analysis. The 2009/10 sample consists of 3,123 randomly 





were selected from the original 783 enumeration areas from the 2005/06 survey. 
Beginning with the 2009/10 survey, the schedule for interviewing households is twice a 
year with six months between visits. 
All regions of Uganda are included in the sample and are divided into six strata: 
Kampala City, Other Urban Areas, Central Rural, Eastern Rural, Western Rural, and 
Northern Rural. Within each stratum, the UNPS enumeration areas were selected from 
the UNHS 2005/06 enumeration areas with equal probability, and with implicit 
stratification by urban/rural and district (in this order), except for the rural portions of ten 
districts that were oversampled by the UNHS 2005/06 survey. In these districts, the 
probabilities were deflated to bring them back to the levels originally intended. Since 
internally displaced persons (IDP) camps are now mostly unoccupied, the extra 
enumeration areas in IDP camps are not a part of the UNPS subsample (Uganda Bureau 
of Statistics 2012). 
The 2005/06 survey included four questionnaires: Household Questionnaire, 
Fisheries Questionnaire, Agriculture Questionnaire, and Community Questionnaire. In 
2009/10, the survey included a Women Questionnaire, but did not include a Fisheries 
Questionnaire. The Household, Agriculture, and Community Questionnaires were still 
included. For this thesis, only the Household Questionnaire was used.  
We do not have access to the identity of the participants, but we have a unique 
household identifier for each household and a unique personal identifier for each 
individual that is a member of a household, and can identify the region and district of 





The Household Questionnaire is divided into several sections. Section 2, the 
household roster, includes basic information, such as age, sex, and marital status, section 
3 collects general information about household members; and section 4 collects 
information about the level of education of all household members above the age of five. 
Sections 5, 6, and 7 collect information about health, nutrition, and disability. Sections 8, 
11, and 12 collect information on type of income generating activities of each member of 
the household (agriculture, wage labor, business enterprise, etc.), the amount of time 
spent in each activity, and the amount of income from each activity. 
Sections 9, 10, 14, and 17 collect information about the welfare and poverty status 
of the household. This includes information such as housing conditions, energy use, and 
household assets. Section 13, Financial Services, will be the main focus of this thesis. 
This section includes information about access to and usage of savings, credit, and 
insurance from a variety of sources, such as credit unions, microfinance institutions, 
savings and credit cooperatives, and commercial banks.  
The three remaining sections, 15, 16, and 18, cover household consumption 
expenditure, household shocks such as drought, flood, or death of a household member, 
coping strategies for household shocks, and transport services, respectively.  
In this thesis the results of the questionnaire are used to estimate the overall 
distributions of household characteristic and access to saving and credit, and then chi-
squared tests are used to find significant relationships between the household 
characteristics and access to financial products from a variety of formal, semi-formal, and 





credit institutions, and micro-deposit taking institutions; semi-formal institutions include 
MFIs, credit unions, and NGOs; and informal institutions include cooperatives, 
employers, SACCOs, informal savings groups, relatives, friends, and moneylenders. The 
household characteristics were chosen based on previous research, and include the 
following. 
The first four variables are characteristics of the household head. These are age, 
gender, marital status, and education level. The survey includes age as a continuous 
variable. For the chi-squared analysis, we grouped age into the following ranges, based 
on age categories of previous research:  
• 15-24  
• 25-44  
• 45-64  
• 65 and older 
We expect to find that the age group 15-24 is more excluded from formal savings 
products due to lack of reliable income or inability to pay the required fees and more 
excluded from informal savings groups due to lack of trust from community members. 
We expect to find that the age group 65 and older to be more excluded from savings 
products, most likely due to self-exclusion. For credit products, we expect to see that the 
age group 15-24 is more excluded from all institution types due to lack of collateral and 
trust. We expect that the age group 65 and older will be more excluded from all 
institution types due to self-exclusion. This age group is less likely to need a loan for 





In terms of savings at formal institutions, women may be more excluded than men 
due to lack of income and financial literacy. We might find that women are more likely to 
be included in informal savings groups because they are viewed as being more 
trustworthy and more likely to save compared with men, who may be viewed by the 
community as less likely to make the weekly savings contribution or make loan 
repayments on time. In terms of credit from formal institutions, we expect to find that 
women are more excluded due to lack of income or collateral. Women may also be 
excluded from credit if their household financial decisions are made by their husband.  
People who are married are more likely to have a second adult income earner or 
potential income earner in the household. Therefore, we expect to find that households 
where the head is married to have greater access to savings and credit products from any 
institution type. Marital status includes the following categories directly from the survey: 
• Married monogamously 
• Married polygamous 
• Separated/divorced 
• Widow/widower 
• Never married 
The education system in Uganda includes seven years of primary school, six years of 
secondary school, and three to five years of post-secondary education. Secondary school 
is divided into four years of lower secondary (senior one through senior four) and two 





school at age five or six. In the survey, education includes 21 levels, which we divided 
into the following categories for the chi-squared analysis: 
• Some schooling but did not complete primary one (P.1) 
• Completed primary one, two, three, or four (P.1 – P.4) 
• Completed primary five, six, or seven (P.5, P.6, or P.7) 
• Completed senior one, two, or three (S.1, S.2, or S.3) 
• Completed senior four, five, or six, or higher education (S.4 or higher education) 
• Other or do not know 
In terms of savings, we expect to find the less educated more likely to be excluded 
at every level due to lack of financial literacy. In terms of informal savings group, this 
may be due to perceived illiteracy by the community rather than actual financial 
illiteracy. In terms of credit, we expect to see less educated more likely to be excluded 
from all institution types due to lack of financial literacy. 
 The fifth variable is household size. In terms of savings, we expect that larger 
households are relatively poor compared with smaller households and may be more 
excluded from formal savings products. Deposit accounts at commercial banks may 
charge a fee for deposits that may be too high to make deposits of less than one dollar at a 
time worthwhile, and they may also have a minimum balance requirement that cannot be 
met by some households. However, if a majority of household members are engaged in 
income generating activities, larger households may have more money to save. We 
expect that the former effect will be greater than the latter and that larger households will 





less excluded from access to savings with an informal savings group if their family is 
well known and respected in the community, although we don’t expect to find a 
difference between large and small households in this respect. 
 In terms of credit, we expect that the effect from more household members 
engaged in income generating activities will be large enough that larger households will 
be less excluded from credit from any institution type. However, this will also depend on 
whether the household lives in a rural or urban area and what type of income generating 
activities the household is engaged in. 
The survey includes household size as a continuous variable. For our analysis, we 
used the following categories from Schreiner’s (2011) poverty scorecard for Uganda: 
• More than five household members 
• Four or five household members 
• Three household members 
• Two household members 
• One household member 
The sixth variable is an indicator variable for whether the household resides in an 
urban or rural area. Rural households are expected to be more excluded from formal 
financial institutions for both credit and savings because of distance to the branch, cost of 
traveling to the branch, and illiteracy. However, they are expected to be less excluded 
from informal financial institutions because many of these institutions are designed to 





to see rural households with greater access to both savings and credit from informal 
savings groups since these community groups tend to be concentrated in rural areas. 
 The seventh variable is an indicator variable for the type of shocks experienced 
by the household. We expect to find that households who have experienced certain 
shocks in the last 12 months are less likely to have access to savings from any source. 
Shocks such as drought, flood, fire, or death or illness of a household head or other 
income earner can be costly to a household and are likely to cause them to deplete any 
savings in the absence of an insurance policy. Similarly, we would expect that 
households that are particularly vulnerable to any of these shocks are more excluded from 
informal credit because the lender may not trust them to repay the loan in the event that 
they do experience the shock. This would likely cause them to divert a loan intended for 
productive purposes to costs associated with recovery from the shock event. However, we 
expect to find that these households are less excluded from credit from informal savings 
groups and other informal sources. Informal savings groups are designed specifically for 
vulnerable households and often include a small emergency loan fund which acts as an 
insurance policy for its members.  
The eighth and ninth variables are type of asset and value of assets. The asset 
values from 2009/10 are deflated to 2005 shilling amounts for comparison purposes. 
Asset value is divided into the following five classes: 
• Zero to one million shillings (approximately 0 to $380) 
• One to two million shillings (approximately $380 to $760) 





• Three to four million shillings (approximately $1140 to $1520) 
• Four to five million shillings (approximately $1520 to $1900) 
• More than five million shillings 
We expect to find that households who own assets that hold value may be more 
excluded from savings as the investment in assets may serve as a substitute for savings. 
In terms of asset value, we expect to see those in the highest asset class to be less 
excluded from savings products from any source. For households in the lower asset value 
classes, we expect to see that they are more excluded from formal sources, but less 
excluded from informal sources of savings products. However, we expect to find that 
households who own large assets such as a house, land, or motor vehicle may be less 
excluded from formal savings because these are likely to be wealthier and more 
financially literate households. We also expect households who own income generating 
assets to be less excluded from savings products from any source.  
In terms of credit, we expect that households who own valuable assets, income 
generating assets, or are in a relatively high asset value class to be less excluded from 
formal sources of credit. For informal credit sources, we may not find the same 
relationship, as many of these sources do not require traditional collateral.  
The last variable indicates the most important source of income for a household 
and has the following categories from the survey: 
• Subsistence farming 
• Commercial farming 





• Non-agricultural enterprises 
• Property income 
• Transfers (pension, allowances, social security benefits) 
• Remittances  
• Organizational support (food aid, World Food Programme, NGOs, etc) 
• Other (specify) 
We expect to find that households that rely on subsistence farming for their main 
income source are more excluded from formal financial institutions for credit and savings 
due to seasonal income flow, low income, and distance to the bank branch. We expect to 
find that these households are less excluded from informal savings groups and other 
sources of informal and semi-formal credit. Some SACCOs serve mainly farmers and 
many informal savings groups are formed as farmers’ cooperatives.  
We expect to find that households whose main source of income is from wage 
employment are less excluded from formal sources of credit because they have a regular 
income source which may cause the bank to find them more trustworthy.  
For households who rely mainly on remittance payments for their income, we 
expect to find that they are less excluded from informal savings. These are likely to be 
poor families who are likely to be excluded from formal savings due to high fees and 
minimum savings requirements; however, they are likely to need a safe place to keep 
their remittance payments and we therefore expect to find they are less excluded from 





these households are more excluded from all sources of credit due to self-exclusion, since 
the remittance payments may act as a substitute for credit. 
Access was measured by a set of indicator variables for credit and savings sources 
from 2005/06 and 2009/10, where 1=yes and 2=no, as follows. 
Savings_05 is an indicator variable for whether someone in the household had a 
savings account or not in 2005/06. Savings was not broken down into separate 
institutions in the 2005/06 survey. 
Credit access for 2005/06 includes the following indicator variables: bank_05, 
MFI_05, ngo_05, coop_05 (cooperatives), landlord_05, employer_05, localGroup_05, 
relative_05, friend_05, moneylender_05, and other_05.  
Savings access for 2009/10 is measured by the following indicator variables:  
creditUnionMFI (credit unions, savings associations, or MFI), SACCO, 
informalSavGroup (savings groups), Formal, and Bank. Bank has been dropped from the 
analysis due to a low response rate.  
Access to credit in 2009/10 is measured by the following indicator variables: 
bankLoan, govAgencyLoan, creditUnionLoan, MFILoan, employerLoan, 
SACCOsavGroupLoan (loan from a SACCO or a savings group), friendRelLoan (loan 
from friend or relative, which was combined into one question in the 2009/10 survey), 
and moneylenderLoan. 
This chapter has explained the methods used in analyzing the relationship 
between household characteristics and access to savings and credit by institution type. 





distributions of access to savings and credit products. It concludes by reporting the results 
obtained from chi-square tests to determine the relationship between household 




























The study examined household characteristics and their effect on access to formal 
finance. This chapter first presents a description of the relevant household characteristics 
followed by the general results of credit and savings usage by type of institution. It then 
presents the effects of the household characteristic variables on savings and credit usage. 
The household characteristics we tested include age, gender, marital status, and education 
level of the household head; household size; whether the household resides in a rural or 
urban location; types of household shocks experienced; asset ownership and value; and 
main income source.  
 
4.1 Household characteristics 
 
 
Over half (0.532 +/- 0.009 in 2005/06 and 0.509 +/- 0.009 in 2009/10) of 
household heads in our sample are in the age group 25-44, and over one quarter of 
household heads are between ages 45-64 (0.267 +/- 0.008 in 2005/06 and 0.319 +/- 0.009 
in 2009/10). Over half are in monogamous marriages (0.544 +/- 0.009 in 2005/06 and 
0.545 +/- 0.009 in 2009/10), just over 18% are polygamous (0.185 +/- 0.007 in 2005/06 
and 0.186 +/- 0.007 in 2009/10), and over 70% are male (0.719 +/- 0.008 in 2009/10). 
About 40% of household heads have completed either primary levels five, six, or seven 
(0.409 +/- 0.010 in 2005/06 and 0.386 +/- 0.010 in 2009/10), and just over 20% have 
completed senior level four or higher education (0.206 +/- 0.008 in 2005/06 and 0.207 +/- 





Table 4.1. Age of Household Head, 2005/06 (N=3117) 
Age Category of 
Household Head 
Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
15-24 0.097 0.005 (0.087, 0.108) 
25-44 0.532 0.009 (0.515, 0.550) 
45-64 0.267 0.008 (0.252, 0.283) 
65 or older 0.103 0.005 (0.092, 0.114) 
 
Table 4.2. Marital Status of Household Head, 2005/06 (N=3117) 
Marital Status of 
Household Head 
Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 




0.544 0.009 (0.527, 0.562) 
Married Polygamous 0.185 0.007 (0.172, 0.199) 
Divorced or Separated 0.082 0.005 (0.072, 0.092) 
Widow or Widower 0.121 0.006 (0.109, 0.132) 
Never Married 0.067 0.004 (0.059, 0.076) 
 
Table 4.3. Education Level of Household Head, 2005/06 (N=2486) 
Education of 
Household Head 
Proportion Std Error for Proportion 95% CL for 
Proportion 
Some school but 
did not finish 
P.1 
0.006 0.002 (0.003, 0.009) 
P.1 through P.4 0.238 0.009 (0.221, 0.255) 
P.5, P.6, or P.7 0.409 0.010 (0.389, 0.428) 
S.1, S.2, or S.3 0.118 0.006 (0.106, 0.131) 
S.4 or Higher 0.206 0.008 (0.190, 0.221) 
Other or Do Not 
Know 
0.023 0.003 (0.017, 0.029) 
 
 
Table 4.4. Age and Marital Status of Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2969) 
Age Category of 
Household Head 
Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
15-24 0.042 0.004 (0.035, 0.049) 
25-44 0.509 0.009 (0.491, 0.527) 
45-64 0.319 0.009 (0.303, 0.336) 






Table 4.5. Marital Status of Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2969) 
Marital Status of 
Household Head 
Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Married Monogamously 0.545 0.009 (0.527, 0.563) 
Married Polygamous 0.186 0.007 (0.172, 0.200) 
Divorced or Separated 0.095 0.005 (0.084, 0.106) 
Widow or Widower 0.143 0.006 (0.130, 0.155) 
Never Married 0.032 0.003 (0.026, 0.038) 
 
Table 4.6. Gender of Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2975) 
Gender Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Female 0.281 0.008 (0.265, 0.297) 
Male 0.719 0.008 (0.703, 0.735) 
 
 
Table 4.7. Education Level of Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2236) 
Education Level Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Some school but 
did not finish P.1 
0.012 0.002 (0.008, 0.017) 
P.1 through P.4 0.262 0.009 (0.244, 0.280) 
P.5, P.6, or P.7 0.386 0.010 (0.365, 0.406) 
S.1, S.2, or S.3 0.102 0.006 (0.089, 0.115) 
S.4 or higher 0.207 0.009 (0.190, 0.224) 
Other or Do Not 
know 
0.031 0.004 (0.024, 0.039) 
 
Almost three-quarters of households in the sample are located in rural areas 
(0.725 +/- 0.008 in 2005/06 and 0.742 +/- 0.008 in 2009/10). About half of our sample 
has five or less household members and about half have more than five members (0.478 
+/- 0.009 in 2005/06 and 0.569 +/- 0.009 in 2009/10). The main income source for almost 
half of households is subsistence farming (0.473 +/- 0.009), while less than two percent 
report commercial farming as their main income source (0.020 +/- 0.003). Just over 20% 





+/- 0.008) as their main income source. Almost five percent rely on remittances as their 
main source (0.050 +/- 0.004), and the remaining five percent report property income 
(0.013 +/- 0.002), transfers (0.004 +/- 0.001), organizational support (0.003 +/- 0.001), or 
‘other’ (0.008 +/- 0.002) as their main source of household income.  
 
Table 4.8. Household Size, 2005/06 (N=3117) 
Household Size Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
1 0.091 0.005 (0.081, 0.101) 
2 0.068 0.005 (0.059, 0.077) 
3 0.101 0.005 (0.090, 0.112) 
4 or 5 0.261 0.008 (0.246, 0.277) 
More than 5 0.478 0.009 (0.461, 0.496) 
 
Table 4.9. Rural/Urban Residence, 2005/06 (N=3123) 
Rural/Urban Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Rural  0.725 0.008 (0.709, 0.740) 
Urban 0.275 0.008 (0.260, 0.291) 
 
Table 4.10. Household Size, 2009/10 (N=2975) 
Household Size Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
1 0.055 0.004 (0.047, 0.064) 
2 0.064 0.004 (0.055, 0.073) 
3 0.079 0.005 (0.069, 0.088) 
4 or 5 0.233 0.008 (0.217, 0.248) 
More than 5 0.569 0.009 (0.551, 0.587) 
 
 
Table 4.11. Rural/Urban Residence, 2009/10 (N=2975) 
Rural/Urban Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Rural  0.742 0.008 (0.726, 0.757) 







Table 4.12. Main Source of Household Income, 2009/10 (N=2928) 
Income Source Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Commercial Farming  0.020 0.003 (0.015, 0.025) 
Non-agricultural 
Enterprise 
0.211 0.008 (0.196, 0.226) 
Organizational Support 0.003 0.001 (0.001, 0.006) 
Other 0.008 0.002 (0.004, 0.011) 
Property Income 0.013 0.002 (0.009, 0.017) 
Remittances 0.050 0.004 (0.042, 0.057) 
Subsistence Farming  0.473 0.009 (0.455, 0.491) 
Transfers 0.004 0.001 (0.002, 0.007) 
Wage Employment 0.219 0.008 (0.204, 0.234) 
 
Several types of household shocks were reported. The most frequently reported 
shock was drought or irregular rains, which accounted for over half of reported shocks in 
2009/10 (0.338 +/- 0.008 in 2005/06 and 0.504 +/- 0.010 in 2009/10). Other shocks that 
were reported somewhat frequently include serious illness or accident of income earner 
(0.071 +/- 0.005) or other household member (0.070 +/- 0.005), death of a family 
member (0.116 +/- 0.005), or flood/hailstorm (0.117 +/- 0.005). 
 
Table 4.13. Household Shocks, 2005/06 (N=3649) 
Type of Shock Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Bad Seed Quality 0.019 0.002 (0.015, 0.024) 
Civil Strife 0.074 0.004 (0.065, 0.082) 
Death of Family Member 0.116 0.005 (0.106, 0.127) 
Death of Household 
Head 
0.027 0.003 (0.022, 0.032) 
Fire Accident 0.029 0.003 (0.023, 0.034) 
Flood/Hailstorm 0.117 0.005 (0.107, 0.127) 
Injury 0.022 0.002 (0.018, 0.027) 
Livestock Epidemic 0.050 0.004 (0.043, 0.057) 
Other 0.030 0.003 (0.025, 0.036) 
Pest Attack 0.081 0.005 (0.072, 0.089) 
Robbery/Theft 0.096 0.005 (0.086, 0.105) 





Table 4.14. Household Shocks, 2009/10 (N=2673) 
Type of Shock Proportion Std Error of 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Conflict/Violence 0.013 0.002 (0.008, 0.017) 
Death of Income Earner 0.010 0.002 (0.006, 0.014) 
Death of Other Household 
Member 
0.028 0.003 (0.021, 0.034) 
Drought/Irregular Rains 0.504 0.010 (0.485, 0.523) 
Fire 0.010 0.002 (0.006, 0.013) 
Floods 0.023 0.003 (0.017, 0.029) 
Landslides/Erosion 0.008 0.002 (0.005, 0.012) 
Loss of Employment 0.003 0.001 (0.001, 0.006) 
Other 0.038 0.004 (0.030, 0.045) 
Reduction in Earnings 0.010 0.002 (0.007, 0.014) 
Serious Illness of Accident of 
Other Household Member 
0.070 0.005 (0.061, 0.080) 
Serious Illness or Accident of 
Income Earner 
0.071 0.005 (0.061, 0.081) 
Theft of Agricultural Assets(crop 
or livestock) 
0.048 0.004 (0.039, 0.056) 
Theft of Money/Valuables/Non-
agricultural Assets 
0.040 0.004 (0.033, 0.047) 
Unusually High Costs of 
Agricultural Inputs 
0.022 0.003 (0.017, 0.028) 
Unusually High Level of Crop 
Pest and Disease 
0.051 0.004 (0.043, 0.060) 
Unusually High Level of 
Livestock Disease 
0.031 0.003 (0.024, 0.037) 
Unusually Low Prices for 
Agricultural Output 
0.020 0.003 (0.015, 0.025) 
 
The most commonly owned household assets were a house (0.147 +/- 0.003 in 
2005/06 and 0.144 +/- 0.003 in 2009/10), furniture and furnishings (0.171 +/- 0.003 and 
0.185 +/- 0.003, respectively, in 2005/06, and 0.160 +/- 0.003 in 2009/10), electronic 
equipment (0.123 +/- 0.003 in 2005/06), radio/cassette (0.119 +/- 0.003 in 2009/10), and 







Table 4.15. Household Assets, 2005/06 (N=16333) 
Asset Type Proportion Std Error of 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Bednets 0.061 0.002 (0.057, 0.065) 
Bicycle 0.072 0.002 (0.068, 0.076) 
Electronic Equipment 0.123 0.003 (0.118, 0.128) 
Furnishings 0.185 0.003 (0.179, 0.191) 
Furniture 0.171 0.003 (0.165, 0.177) 
Generators 0.002 0.000 (0.001, 0.002) 
House 0.147 0.003 (0.141, 0.152) 
Household Appliances 0.071 0.002 (0.067, 0.075) 
Jewelry and Watches 0.069 0.002 (0.065, 0.073) 
Mobile Phone 0.038 0.001 (0.035, 0.041) 
Motorcycle 0.005 0.001 (0.004, 0.006) 
Other 0.012 0.001 (0.010, 0.014) 
Other Buildings 0.041 0.002 (0.038, 0.045) 
Other transport 
equipment 
0.004 0.000 (0.003, 0.005) 
Solar Panel/Electric 
Inverters 
0.001 0.000 (0.001, 0.002) 
 
Table 4.16. Household Assets, 2009/10 (N=16236) 
Asset Type Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Bicycle 0.074 0.002 (0.070, 0.078) 
Boat  0.001 0.000 (0.001, 0.002) 
Computer 0.005 0.001 (0.004, 0.006) 
Furniture/Furnishings 0.160 0.003 (0.155, 0.166) 
Generators  0.003 0.000 (0.002, 0.004) 
House 0.144 0.003 (0.139, 0.150) 
Household Appliances 0.134 0.001 (0.031, 0.036) 
Internet Access 0.000 0.000 (0.000, 0.000) 
Jewelry and Watches 0.036 0.001 (0.033, 0.039) 
Land 0.133 0.003 (0.128, 0.138) 
Mobile Phone 0.094 0.002 (0.089, 0.098) 
Motor Vehicle 0.005 0.001 (0.004, 0.006) 
Motorcycle 0.012 0.001 (0.011, 0.014) 
Other Buildings 0.052 0.002 (0.048, 0.055) 
Other Electronic Equipment 0.005 0.001 (0.004, 0.006) 
Other Household Assets 0.023 0.001 (0.021, 0.026) 
Other Transport Equipment 0.000 0.000 (0.000, 0.001) 
Radio/Cassette 0.119 0.003 (0.114, 0.124) 





Asset Type Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Television 0.023 0.001 (0.020, 0.025) 
Other 1 0.053 0.002 (0.050, 0.057) 
Other 2 0.020 0.001 (0.018, 0.022) 
 
 The large majority of households in the sample own assets valued between zero 
and one million shillings (0.734 +/- 0.009 in 2005/06). The proportion of households in 
each asset value class decreases as asset value increases, until the last class. The last asset 
class includes all households with assets valued greater than five million shillings. 
Although there is a slight increase in proportion here, there is still a relatively low 
proportion of households in this asset value class (0.105 +/- 0.006) when compared with 
the lowest asset value class.  
 
Table 4.17. Asset Value, 2005/06 (N=2657) 
Asset Value Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
0 to 1 Million  0.734 0.009 (0.717, 0.750) 
1 to 2 Million 0.081 0.005 (0.070, 0.091) 
2 to 3 Million 0.040 0.004 (0.032, 0.047) 
3 to 4 Million 0.026 0.003 (0.020, 0.032) 
4 to 5 Million 0.016 0.002 (0.011, 0.021) 
More than 5 
Million 
0.105 0.006 (0.093, 0.116) 
 
In 2009/10, there is a similar pattern; however, the majority of households are in 
the top asset value class of over five million shillings (0.327 +/- 0.009), followed by the 









Table 4.18. Asset Value, 2009/10 (N=2927) 
Asset Value Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
0 to 1 Million  0.309 0.009 (0.292, 0.325) 
1 to 2 Million 0.155 0.007 (0.141, 0.168) 
2 to 3 Million 0.093 0.005 (0.082, 0.104) 
3 to 4 Million 0.065 0.005 (0.056, 0.074) 
4 to 5 Million 0.052 0.004 (0.044, 0.060) 
More than 5 
Million 
0.327 0.009 (0.310, 0.344) 
 
 
4.2 Savings and Credit Usage by Institution Type 
 
 
 The four institutions we observed for deposit account usage are formal institution; 
credit union, savings association, or MFI; SACCO; or informal savings group. 
 In 2005/06, 16.8% (+/-0.007) of households had access to a formal savings 
account, which increased slightly to 17.9% (+/-0.007) in 2009/10. In 2009/10, 17.4% (+/-
0.007) of households were saving with an informal group, while only 9.6% (+/-0.005) 
had a savings account at a credit union, savings association, or MFI and 6.6% (+/-0.005) 
at a SACCO. 
 
Table 4.19. Formal Savings Account, 2005/06 (N=3101) 
Institution Type Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 




0.168 0.007 (0.818, 0.845) 
 
Table 4.20. Savings, 2009/10 (N=2937) 
Institution Type Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 





0.096 0.005 (0.086, 0.107) 





Institution Type Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 




0.174 0.007 (0.160, 0.188) 
Formal Institution 0.179 0.007 (0.165, 0.192) 
 
 We left the “bank” category out of the analysis because of a low response rate. 
However, 15% of the overall sample answered “yes” to having access to a savings 
account at a bank, and if any of the missing responses would have answered “yes”, this 
proportion could be higher than 15%.  
The institutions observed for access to credit include bank, government agency, 
credit union, MFI, NGO, cooperative, employer, informal group or SACCO, relative or 
friend, and moneylender. The 2005/06 data represents institution type as a percentage of 
total loans taken whereas the 2009/10 data represents the percentage of households in the 
sample that took a loan from that particular source. Therefore, the 2005/06 and 2009/10 
proportions cannot be compared to each other. 
 
Table 4.21. Credit, 2005/06 (N=902) 
Institution Type Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for Proportion 
Bank 0.083 0.009 (0.065, 0.101) 
MFI 0.131 0.011 (0.109, 0.153) 
NGO 0.022 0.005 (0.013, 0.032) 
Cooperative 0.006 0.002 (0.001, 0.010) 
Landlord 0.000 0.000 (0.000, 0.000) 
Employer 0.013 0.004 (0.006, 0.021) 
Local/informal Savings 
Group 
0.147 0.012 (0.124, 0.171) 
Relative 0.142 0.012 (0.119, 0.165) 
Friend 0.355 0.016 (0.323, 0.386) 
Moneylender 0.025 0.005 (0.015, 0.036) 






The majority of 2005/06 loans were taken from friends and relatives, at 35.5% 
(+/-0.016) and 14.2% (+/-0.012), respectively. Informal savings groups accounted for 
14.7% (+/-0.012) of loans, MFIs accounted for 13.1% (+/-0.011), and banks accounted 
for 8.3% (+/-0.009).  In 2009/10, 24.7% (+/-0.008) of households borrowed from friends 
and relatives, 13.2% (+/-0.006) from informal groups or SACCOs, and 5.2% (+/-0.004) 
from banks. Only 4.6% (+/-0.004) of households borrowed from an MFI. Since the 
2005/06 data accounts for multiple loans from the same household and the 2009/10 data 
does not, we do not know for sure if usage in any of these categories has increased or 
decreased. 
 
Table 4.22. Credit, 2009/10 (N=2918) 
Institution Type Proportion Std Error for 
Proportion 
95% CL for 
Proportion 
Bank Loan 0.052 0.004 (0.044, 0.060) 
Government Agency Loan 0.001 0.001 (0.000, 0.003) 
Credit Union Loan 0.019 0.003 (0.014, 0.024) 
MFI Loan 0.046 0.004 (0.038, 0.053) 
Employer Loan 0.010 0.002 (0.006, 0.013) 
SACCO or Savings Group 
Loan 
0.132 0.006 (0.120, 0.145) 
Loan from Friend or 
Relative 
0.247 0.008 (0.231, 0.262) 
Moneylender Loan 0.011 0.002 (0.007, 0.014) 
 
4.3 Effects of household characteristics on savings account access 
 
 
 Households whose head is between the ages of 15-24 or 65 and older were less 
likely to have a savings account at a formal institution than those whose head is between 
the ages of 25-44 or 45-64 in both 2005/06 and 2009/10. Households whose head is 





a formal institution as those whose head is between the ages of 25-44 and 45-64, 
respectively, in 2005/06, and 0.33 and 0.37 times as likely in 2009/10. Households whose 
head is age 65 or older were 0.61 and 0.68 times as likely to have access to a savings 
account at a formal institution as those whose head is between the ages of 25-44 and 45-
64, respectively, in 2005/06, and 0.59 and 0.68 times as likely in 2009/10. Households 
whose head is between the ages of 15-24 were 0.48 and 0.45 times as likely to have 
access to a savings account at a credit union, savings institution, or MFI, as households 
whose head is between the ages of 25-44 and 45-64, respectively. In the same category, 
households whose head is age 65 or older were 0.48 and 0.45 times as likely as 
households whose head is between the ages of 25-44 and 45-64, respectively. For savings 
with an informal savings group, households whose head is between the ages of 15-24 
were 0.81 and 0.68 times as likely to have access as households whose head is between 
the ages of 25-44 and 45-64, respectively. Households whose head is age 65 or older 
were 0.62 and 0.52 times as likely to borrow from an informal savings group as 
households whose head is between the ages of 25-44 and 45-64, respectively. 
 
Table 4.23. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Age of Household Head, 2005/06 
(N=3094, Chi-square=34.4659) 
Age Category of 
Household Head 
N Proportion 
15-24  302 0.070 
25-44  1642 0.194 
45-64  829 0.174 








Table 4.24. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Age of Household Head, 2009/10 
(N=2908, Chi-square=25.1370) 
Age Category of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
15-24  121 0.066 
25-44  1476 0.203 
45-64  929 0.177 
65 or older  382 0.120 
 
Table 4.25. Access to Savings Account at a Credit Union, Savings Institution, or 
MFI by Age of Household Head, 2009/2010 (N=2913, Chi-square=15.3393) 
Age Category of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
15-24  121 0.050 
25-44  1480 0.103 
45-64  930 0.110 
65 or older  382 0.050 
 
Table 4.26. Access to Savings Account at an Informal Savings Group by Age of 
Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2913, Chi-square=20.0390) 
Age Category of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
15-24  121 0.141 
25-44  1480 0.173 
45-64  930 0.208 
65 or older  382 0.107 
 
 Female headed households were 0.72 times as likely to have a savings account 
with a formal institution as male headed households in 2009/10. There was no significant 
difference in access to savings accounts from credit unions, savings associations, MFIs, 
SACCOs, or informal savings groups for female and male headed households. 
 
Table 4.27. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Gender, 2009/10 (N=2913, Chi-
square=11.7510) 
Gender N Proportion 





Gender N Proportion 
Male  2093 0.193 
 
 There was a significant difference in access to a savings account at a formal 
institution depending on marital status in 2005/06 and 2009/10. Households where the 
head is divorced/separated or widowed were both 0.48 times as likely to have access 
while those who were never married were 1.21 times more likely to have access, 
compared with households whose head is married monogamously. In 2009/10, 
households where the head was never married were about twice as likely as households 
whose head is married and about three times as likely as households whose head is 
divorced/separated or widowed to have a savings account at a formal institution. There 
was also a significant difference in access to an informal savings group depending on 
marital status, with divorced/separated, widowed, and never married heads of household 
0.88, 0.75, and 0.62 times as likely, respectively, to save with an informal savings group 
compared to households whose head is married monogamously. The same result was 
found for savings at SACCOs, credit unions, savings associations, and MFIs, although 
the difference was not as great as that of formal institutions and informal savings groups. 
 
Table 4.28. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Marital Status, 2005/06 
(N=3095, Chi-square=37.5271) and 2009/10 
Marital Status N Proportion 
Married monogamously  1686 0.188 
Married Polygamous  572 0.175 
Divorced/Separated  254 0.091 
Widow/Widower  377 0.090 








Table 4.29. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Marital Status, 2009/10 
(N=2907, Chi-square=45.4365) 
Marital Status N Proportion 
Married monogamously  1592 0.194 
Married Polygamous  535 0.172 
Divorced/Separated  274 0.139 
Widow/Widower 43 0.104 
Never Married  34 0.374 
 
 
Table 4.30. Access to Savings with an Informal Savings Group by Marital Status, 
2009/10 (N=2912, Chi-square=15.5913)  
Marital Status N  Proportion 
Married Monogamously  1594 0.176 
Married Polygamous  536 0.218 
Divorced/Separated  276 0.156 
Widow/Widower  415 0.133 
Never Married  91 0.110 
 
 
Table 4.31. Access to Savings at a SACCO by Marital Status, 2009/10 (N=2912, Chi-
square=8.2339) 
Marital Status N Proportion 
Married Monogamously  1594 0.075 
Married Polygamous 536 0.075 
Divorced/Separated 276 0.044 
Widow/Widower  415 0.046 
Never Married  91 0.044 
 
Table 4.32. Access to Savings at a Credit Union, Savings Association, or MFI by 
Marital Status, 2009/10 (N=2913, Chi-square=8.5887) 
Marital Status N Proportion 
Married Monogamously  1594 0.096 
Married Polygamous  536 0.123 
Divorced/Separated  276 0.091 
Widow/Widower 415 0.068 







 Households whose head has completed senior four or higher were more likely 
than those with primary school education or lower to have a savings account at a formal 
institution. In 2005/06, these households were 2.59, 6.92, and 13.67 times more likely 
than households whose head finished some high school, finished primary five, six or 
seven, or finished some primary, respectively. In 2009/10, these households were 2.14, 
4.12, and 7.36 times more likely than households whose head finished some high school, 
finished primary five, six, or seven, or finished some primary, respectively. The 
difference for savings accounts at SACCOs, credit institutions, savings associations, and 
MFIs was very similar to that of formal institutions, although there is not as large a 
difference between household heads who have post secondary education and those who 
have only primary education. 
 
Table 4.33. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Education Level of Household 
Head, 2005/06 (N=2466, Chi-square=647.4894)  
Education Level N Proportion 
P.1, P.2, P.3, or P.4 (some 
primary)  
587 0.043 
P.5, P.6, or P.7 (primary five 
or higher)  
1010 0.084 
S.1, S.2, or S.3 (some high 
school)  
293 0.225 
S.4, S.5, S.6, or Higher 
Education  
503 0.583 
Did not finish P.1  15 0.067 
Other or do not know 58 0.276 
 
Table 4.34. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Education Level of the 
Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2218, Chi-square=383.4034) 
Education Level Number Proportion 







Education Level Number Proportion 
P.5, P.6, or P.7 (primary 
five or higher)  
856 0.126 
S.1, S.2, or S.3 (some high 
school)  
226 0.243 
S.4, S.5, S.6, or Higher 
Education  
458 0.520 
Did not finish P.1  27 0.000 
Other or do not know  70 0.314 
 
Table 4.35. Access to Savings at a Credit Union, Savings Association, or MFI by 
Education Level of Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2222, Chi-square=48.6116) 
Education Level  N Proportion 
P.1, P.2, P.3, or P.4 (some 
primary school)  
582 0.065 
P.5, P.6, or P.7 (primary 
five or higher)  
858 0.100 
S.1, S.2, or S.3 (some high 
school)  
226 0.155 
S.4, S.5, S.6, or Higher 
Education 
459 0.190 
Did not finish P.1 27 0.000 
Other or do not know 70 0.100 
 
 Access to savings with an informal savings group is greatest for households 
whose head has completed primary five, six, or seven. These households are 1.04, 1.11, 
and 1.08 times as likely to have access to savings at an informal savings group as 
households whose head complete senior four or higher education, some high school, or 
some primary school, respectively.  
 
Table 4.36. Access to Savings at a SACCO by Education of the Household Head, 
2009/10 (N=2222, Chi-Square=23.1475) 
Education Level  N Proportion 
P.1, P.2, P.3, or P.4 (some primary) 582 0.043 
P.5, P.6, or P.7 858 0.078 
S.1, S.2, or S.3 (some high school) 226 0.093 





Education Level  N Proportion 
Did not finish P.1 27 0.000 
Other or do not know 70 0.071 
 
Table 4.37. Access to Savings at an Informal Savings Group by Education of the 
Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2222, Chi-Square=10.0155) 
Education Level  N Proportion 
P.1, P.2, P.3, or P.4 (some 
primary) 
582 0.187 
P.5, P.6, or P.7 858 0.202 
S.1, S.2, or S.3 (some high 
school) 
226 0.181 
S.4, S.5, S.6, or Higher 
Education 
459 0.194 
Did not finish P.1 27 0.037 
Other or do not know 70 0.086 
 
 There was a significant difference between household size and access to a savings 
account in 2005/06 and 2009/10. Households with more than five members have a higher 
percentage of savings use in all institution types compared with households with one to 
five members. In 2005/06, households with more than five members were 1.38, 1.82, 
1.96, and 1.23 times as likely to have access to a formal savings account than households 
with four or five members, three members, two members, and one member, respectively. 
In 2009/10, households with more than five members were 1.56, 1.33, 2.04, and 1.24 
times as likely to have access to a savings account as households with four to five 
members, three member, two members, or one member, respectively. 
 
Table 4.38. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Household Size, 2005/06 
(N=3096, Chi-square=28.9581)  
Household Size N Proportion 
1 279 0.165 
2 213 0.103 





Household Size N Proportion 
4-5 811 0.147 
> 5 1479 0.203 
 
Table 4.39. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Household Size, 2009/10 
(N=2913, Chi-square=27.4594) 
Household Size N Proportion 
1 161 0.168 
2 186 0.102 
3 230 0.157 
4-5 673 0.134 
> 5 1663 0.208 
 
Table 4.40. Access to Savings at a Credit Union, Savings Association, MFI, or 
SACCO by Household Size, 2009/10 (N=2918, Chi-square=21.8484) 
Household Size N Proportion 
1 162 0.056 
2 186 0.054 
3 230 0.096 
4-5 673 0.067 
>5 1667 0.117 
 
Table 4.41. Access to Savings at a SACCO by Household Size, 2009/10 (N=2918, 
Chi-square=29.2770) 
Household Size N Proportion 
1 4; 2.47% 0.025 
2 6; 3.23% 0.032 
3 9; 3.91% 0.039 
4-5 29; 4.31% 0.043 
>5 147; 8.82% 0.088 
 
Table 4.42. Access to Savings with an Informal Savings Group by Household Size, 
2009/10 (N=2918, Chi-square=17.5817) 
Household Size N Proportion 
1 162 0.111 
2 186 0.129 
3 230 0.113 
4-5 673 0.172 





 Urban households were more than three times as likely as rural households to 
have a savings account at a formal financial institution and almost twice as likely to have 
savings with a credit union, savings association, or MFI, while they were 0.76 times as 
likely as rural households to save with an informal group.  
 
Table 4.43. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Rural/Urban Residence, 2005/06 
(N=3101, Chi-square=288.7005)  
Rural/Urban N Proportion 
Rural 2251 0.098 
Urban 850 0.354 
 
  
Table 4.44. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Rural/Urban Residence, 2009/10 
N=2913, Chi-square=229.2849) 
Rural/Urban N Proportion 
Rural 2163 0.115 
Urban 750 0.360 
 
 
Table 4.45. Access to Savings at a Credit Union, Savings Association, or MFI by 
Rural/Urban Residence, 2009/10 (N=2918, Chi-square=30.8251) 
Rural/Urban N Proportion 
Rural  2167 0.078 
Urban 751 0.148 
 
Table 4.46. Access to Savings at an Informal Savings Group by Rural/Urban 
Residence, 2009/10 (N=2918, Chi-square=7.4881) 
Rural/Urban N Proportion 
Rural  2167 0.185 
Urban 751 0.141 
 
 Households who experienced drought, flood, pest attack, fire, or civil strife in 





account at a formal institution as the average household which experienced any shock 
during that time. 
 
Table 4.47. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Household Shock, 2005/06 
(N=3627, Chi-square=60.6285) 
Type of Household Shock N Proportion 
Drought 1229 0.099 
Flood/Hailstorm 425 0.111 
Pest Attack 293 0.106 
Bad Seed Quality 71 0.197 
Livestock Epidemic 180 0.128 
Fire 104 0.096 
Civil Strife 269 0.112 
Robbery/Theft 347 0.216 
Death of Household Head 98 0.122 
Death of Family Member 420 0.183 
Injury from Accident 81 0.247 
Other 110 0.146 
Total 3627 0.132 
 
 Households that experienced fire or floods were 0.30 and 0.64 times as likely to 
have a savings account at a formal institution compared with all household who have 
experienced a shock in 2009/10. Compared with all households who have experienced a 
shock, households who experienced an unusually high level of crop pest and disease were 
0.86 times as likely to have access to an informal savings group; households with an 
unusually high cost of agricultural inputs were 0.60 times as likely to have access to an 
informal savings group; households with unusually low prices for agricultural output 
were 0.58 times as likely to have access to an informal savings group; households that 
experienced the death of an income earner or other household member were 0.65 and 
0.80 times as likely, respectively, to have access to an informal savings group; 





0.79 times as likely, respectively, to have access to an informal savings group; and 
households who experienced a fire were 0.45 times as likely to have access to an informal 










































Table 4.48. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Household Shock, 2009/10 
(N=2643, Chi-square=35.6714) 
Type of Household Shock N Proportion 
Drought/Irregular Rains 1332 0.115 
Floods 62 0.081 
Landslide/Erosion 22 0.000 
Unusually high level of crop 
pest and disease 
135 0.170 
Unusually high level of 
livestock disease 
81 0.136 
Unusually high costs of 
agricultural inputs 
58 0.103 
Unusually low prices for 
agricultural output 
50 0.200 
Reduction in earnings 28 0.321 
Loss of employment 9 0.444 
Serious illness or accident of 
income earner 
188 0.128 
Serious illness or accident of 
other household member 
186 0.118 
Death of income earner 27 0.185 
Death of other household 
member 
73 0.164 
Theft of money, valuables, or 
non-agricultural assets 
105 0.171 
Theft of agricultural assets 
(crops of livestock) 
126 0.103 
Conflict/Violence 34 0.118 
Fire 26 0.039 
Other 101 0.149 
Total 2643 0.127 
 
Table 4.49. Access to Savings at an Informal Savings Group by Household Shocks, 
2009/10 (N=2647, Chi-square=27.1372) 
Type of Household Shock N Proportion 
Drought/Irregular Rains 1333 0.177 
Floods 62 0.226 
Landslide/Erosion 22 0.227 
Unusually high level of crop 
pest and disease 
136 0.147 







Type of Household Shock N Proportion 
Unusually high costs of 
agricultural inputs 
58 0.103 
Unusually low prices for 
agricultural output 
50 0.100 
Reduction in earnings 28 0.179 
Loss of employment 9 0.000 
Serious illness or accident 
of income earner 
188 0.176 
Serious illness or accident 
of other household member 
186 0.161 
Death of income earner 27 0.111 
Death of other household 
member 
73 0.137 
Theft of money, valuables, 
or non-agricultural assets 
106 0.113 
Theft of agricultural assets 
(crops of livestock) 
126 0.135 
Conflict/Violence 34 0.177 
Fire 26 0.077 
Other 101 0.277 
Total 2647 0.171 
 
 In 2005/06, households who owned generators, transport equipment, or solar 
panel/electric inverters were 2.96, 3.55, and 2.77 times as likely to have a savings 
account at a formal institution as the average household owning at least one asset. 
Households who own a house were 0.63 times as likely as the average asset-owning 
household to have access to a savings account. 
 
Table 4.50. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Asset, 2005/06 (N=16223, Chi-
square=898.4699) 
Asset  N Proportion 
Bednets 985 0.336 
Bicycle 1172 0.195 
Electronic Equipment 1991 0.241 
Furnishings 3000 0.173 
Furniture 2777 0.182 





Asset  N Proportion 
House 2381 0.148 
Household Appliances 1148 0.294 
Jewelry and Watches 1115 0.327 
Mobile Phone 609 0.557 
Motorcycle 77 0.507 
Other 193 0.259 
Other Buildings 673 0.250 




Total  16223 0.234 
 
 Households that own a computer were 2.64 times as likely as households that own 
other assets to have a savings account at a formal institution in 2009/10. Similarly, 
households that own a generator were 2.12 times as likely, households that own a motor 
vehicle were 3.05 times as likely, households who own electronic equipment were 2.42 
times as likely, households that own transport equipment were 3.03 times as likely, 
households who own solar panels/electric inverters were 1.83 times as likely, and 
households that own a television were 2.26 times as likely as households who own other 
assets to have a savings account at a formal institution in 2009/10. Households that own a 
boat, house, or land were 0.45, 0.71, and 0.69 times as likely as households who own 
other assets to have a savings account at a formal institution in 2009/10. 
 Households that own a boat or solar panels were 1.66 and 1.31 times as likely to 
have savings at an informal savings group in 2009/10 as households who own other 
assets. Households that own a motor vehicle were 0.38 times as likely as households who 






Table 4.51. Access to Savings with an Informal Savings Group by Asset, 2009/10 
(N=16130, Chi-square=89.1213) 
Asset  N Proportion 
Bicycle 1196 0.202 
Boat  19 0.316 
Computer 77 0.130 
Furniture/Furnishings 2588 0.183 
Generators 50 0.120 
House 2325 0.186 
Household Appliances 537 0.129 
Internet Access 1 0.000 
Jewelry and Watches 582 0.180 
Land 2142 0.203 
Mobile Phone 1515 0.193 
Motor Vehicle 82 0.073 
Motorcycle 200 0.190 
Other 1 859 0.187 
Other 2 324 0.207 
Other Buildings 834 0.200 
Other Electronic Equipment 84 0.107 
Other Household Assets 377 0.321 
Other Transport Equipment 7 0.000 
Radio/Cassette 1919 0.193 
Solar Panel/Electric Inverters 44 0.250 
Television 368 0.130 
Total 16130 0.190 
 
Table 4.52. Access to Savings at a Formal Institution by Asset, 2009/10 (N=16098, 
Chi-square=818.2343) 
Asset  N Proportion 
Bicycle 1193 0.197 
Boat  19 0.105 
Computer 77 0.623 
Furniture/Furnishings 2583 0.189 
Generators 50 0.500 
House 2321 0.167 
Household Appliances 535 0.398 
Internet Access 1 1.000 
Jewelry and Watches 580 0.353 
Land 2138 0.163 
Mobile Phone 1511 0.313 
Motor Vehicle 82 0.720 





Asset  N Proportion 
Other 1 858 0.204 
Other 2 324 0.225 
Other Buildings 831 0.218 
Other Electronic Equipment 84 0.571 
Other Household Assets 377 0.252 
Other Transport Equipment 7 0.714 




Television 368 0.533 
Total 16098 0.236 
 
 In 2009/10, compared with all other asset types, households that own a computer 
were 1.78 times as likely to have a savings account at a credit union, savings association, 
or MFI. Similarly, households that own a generator were 1.54 times as likely, households 
that own a motor vehicle were 1.78 times as likely, households that own electronic 
equipment were 2.14 times as likely, and households that own a television were 1.49 
times as likely to have a savings account at a credit union, savings association, or MFI 
compared to the average household that owns any other asset. Households that own land 
or a house were 0.82 and 0.73 times as likely to have a savings account at a credit union, 
savings association, or MFI, as the average household that owns assets. 
 Households that own a motor vehicle or solar panel were 1.65 and 1.96 times as 
likely to have savings at a SACCO compared with households who own any other assets. 
Households that own land or a house were 0.95 and 0.91 times as likely to have savings 







Table 4.53. Access to Savings at a Credit Union, Savings Association, or MFI by 
Asset, 2009/10 (N=16130, Chi-square=145.6337) 
Asset  N Proportion 
Bicycle 1196 0.125 
Boat  19 0.105 
Computer 77 0.208 
Furniture/Furnishings 2588 0.102 
Generators 50 0.180 
House 2325 0.085 
Household Appliances 537 0.155 
Internet Access 1 0.000 
Jewelry and Watches 582 0.150 
Land 2142 0.095 
Mobile Phone 1515 0.139 
Motor Vehicle 82 0.207 
Motorcycle 200 0.195 
Other 1 859 0.080 
Other 2 324 0.096 
Other Buildings 834 0.164 
Other Electronic Equipment 84 0.250 
Other Household Assets 377 0.111 
Other Transport Equipment 7 0.286 
Radio/Cassette 1919 0.121 
Solar Panel/Electric Inverters 44 0.136 
Television 368 0.174 
Total 16130 0.117 
 
 
Table 4.54. Access to Savings at a SACCO by Asset, 2009/10 (N=16130, Chi-
square=48.3538) 
Asset N Proportion 
Bicycle 1196 0.088 
Boat  19 0.105 
Computer 77 0.065 
Furniture/Furnishings 2588 0.071 
Generators 50 0.060 
House 2325 0.074 
Household Appliances 537 0.089 
Internet Access 1 0.000 
Jewelry and Watches 582 0.093 
Land 2142 0.077 
Mobile Phone 1515 0.100 
Motor Vehicle 82 0.134 





Asset N Proportion 
Other 1 859 0.051 
Other 2 324 0.077 
Other Buildings 834 0.078 
Other Electronic Equipment 84 0.095 
Other Household Assets 377 0.133 
Other Transport Equipment 7 0.000 




Television 368 0.082 
Total 16130 0.081 
 
 In 2005/06, households with assets worth between zero and one million shillings 
were less likely to have access to savings than households in any other asset class. They 
were between 0.119 and 0.324 times as likely to have access to a savings account as other 
households in higher asset value classes. The same was not true in 2009/10, where 
households in the lowest asset value class were 0.281 times as likely to have access to a 
formal savings account as households with assets valued over five million, but 1.169 
times as likely as households with assets valued between one and two million shillings.  
 In both years, households with assets valued over five million shillings were the 
most likely to have access to savings at a formal institution. In 2005/06, they were 
between 1.546 and 8.416 times as likely as households in other asset value classes to 
have access to a formal savings account. In 2009/10, they were between 2.899 and 4.157 









Table 4.55. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Asset Value, 2005/06 (N=2643, 
Chi-square=552.2337) 
Asset Value Class N  Proportion 
0 to 1 Million 1942 0.070 
1 to 2 Million 213 0.216 
2 to 3 Million 103 0.243 
3 to 4 Million 68 0.353 
4 to 5 Million 42 0.381 
More than 5 Million 275 0.589 
 
Table 4.56. Access to Formal Institution Savings by Asset Value, 2009/10 (N=2900, 
Chi-square=266.4796) 
Asset Value Class N Proportion 
0 to 1 Million 895 0.097 
1 to 2 Million 448 0.083 
2 to 3 Million 270 0.100 
3 to 4 Million 187 0.118 
4 to 5 Million 151 0.119 
More than 5 Million 949 0.345 
 
 Households in the lowest asset value class were the least likely to have a savings 
account at a SACCO or informal savings group in 2009/10, but were 1.125 times as 
likely as households with assets valued between one and two million shillings and 1.189 
times as likely as households with assets valued between two and three million shillings 
to have access to a savings account at a credit union, savings association, or MFI. 
Households with more than five million shillings in assets were between 1.677 and 3.038 
more likely than other households to have access to a savings account at a credit union, 
savings association, or MFI and between 1.131 and 4.000 times as likely to have access 
to a savings account at a SACCO. Households in the lowest asset class are less likely 
than households in any other asset class to have access to savings at a SACCO or 





Table 4.57. Access to Savings at a Credit Union, Savings Association, or MFI by 
Asset Value, 2009/10 (N=2905, Chi-square=70.5703) 
Asset Value Class N Proportion 
0 to 1 Million 895 0.063 
1 to 2 Million 449 0.056 
2 to 3 Million 271 0.074 
3 to 4 Million 188 0.096 
4 to 5 Million 151 0.053 
More than 5 Million 951 0.161 
 
Table 4.58. Access to Savings at a SACCO by Asset Value, 2009/10 (N=2905, Chi-
square=58.4151) 
Asset Value Class N Proportion 
0 to 1 Million 895 0.028 
1 to 2 Million 449 0.049 
2 to 3 Million 271 0.048 
3 to 4 Million 188 0.075 
4 to 5 Million 151 0.099 
More than 5 Million 951 0.112 
 
Table 4.59. Access to Savings at an Informal Savings Group by Asset Value, 2009/10 
(N=2905, Chi-square=32.2437) 
Asset Value Class N  Proportion 
0 to 1 Million 895 0.118 
1 to 2 Million 449 0.174 
2 to 3 Million 271 0.188 
3 to 4 Million 188 0.202 
4 to 5 Million 151 0.238 
More than 5 Million 951 0.207 
 
 Households whose main income source is subsistence farming were 0.46 times as 
likely to have a savings account at a formal institution, but 1.08 times as likely to save 
with an informal savings group compared with the average of all households grouped by 
main income source. Households whose main income is from remittances were 0.70 





with an informal savings group compared with the average of all households grouped by 
main income source.  
 
Table 4.60. Access to Savings from a Formal Institution by Main Source of 
Household Income, 2009/10 (N=2902, Chi-square=230.2154) 
Main Source of Household 
Income 
N Proportion 
Subsistence Farming 1374 0.082 
Commercial Farming 57 0.211 
Wage Employment 636 0.318 
Non-agricultural Enterprise 608 0.235 
Property Income 38 0.526 
Transfers 13 0.462 
Remittances 145 0.124 
Organizational Support 10 0.000 
Other 21 0.143 
Total 2902 0.178 
 
Table 4.61. Access to Savings at an Informal Savings Group by Main Source of 
Household Income, 2009/10 (N=2907, Chi-square=31.6281) 
Main Source of Household 
Income 
N Proportion 
Subsistence Farming 1376 0.188 
Commercial Farming 57 0.211 
Wage Employment 637 0.146 
Non-agricultural Enterprise 610 0.210 
Property Income 38 0.105 
Transfers 13 0.077 
Remittances 145 0.048 
Organizational Support 10 0.000 
Other 21 0.143 
Total 2907 0.174 
 
 
4.4 Effects of household characteristics on credit access 
 
 
 In 2005/06, households where the household head is between the ages of 15-24 





head is between the ages of 25-44 and 45-64, respectively. Households whose head is age 
65 or older were 0.47 and 0.37 times as likely to have access to bank credit than 
households whose heads are between the ages of 25-44 and 45-64, respectively. In 
2009/10, households whose head is between the ages of 15-24 were 0.26 and 0.33 times 
as likely to have access to bank credit than households whose head is between the ages of 
25-44 and 45-64, respectively. Households whose head is age 65 or older were 0.37 and 
0.48 times as likely to have access to bank credit than households whose head is between 
the ages of 25-44 and 45-64, respectively.   
 
Table 4.62. Access to Bank Credit by Age of Household Head, 2005/06 (N=902, Chi-
square=7.2020) 
Age Category of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
15-24 67 0.015 
25-44 543 0.085 
45-64 242 0.107 
65 or older 50 0.040 
 
Table 4.63. Access to Bank Credit by Age of Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2913, 
Chi-square=13.4958) 
Age Category of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
15-24 121 0.017 
25-44 1480 0.064 
45-64 930 0.050 
65 or older 382 0.024 
 
 There was a significant difference in loans from a friend in 2005/06, with 
households whose head is between the ages of 15-24 more than 1.5 times as likely to take 





older, and twice as likely as those whose head is between the ages of 45-64. No 
households with heads between the ages of 15-24 had access to credit from an MFI. 
 
Table 4.64. Access to Credit from a Friend by Age of Household Head, 2005/06 
(N=902, Chi-square=22.7356) 
Age Category of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
15-24 67 0.612 
25-44 543 0.344 
45-64 242 0.302 
65 or older 50 0.380 
 
Table 4.65. Access to Credit from MFI by Age of Household Head, 2005/06 (N=902, 
Chi-square=11.8294) 
Age Category of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
15-24 67 0.000 
25-44 543 0.149 
45-64 242 0.124 
65 or older 50 0.140 
 
In 2009/10, households whose head is between the ages of 15-24 were 0.31 and 
0.35 times as likely to borrow from an MFI, and 0.58 and 0.47 times as likely to borrow 
from a SACCO or informal savings group than households whose head is between the 
ages of 25-44 or 45-64, respectively. The results from 2009/10 also show that households 
whose head is age 65 and older were 0.53, 0.50, and 0.64 times as likely to borrow from 
friends or relatives than households whose head is between the ages of 15-24, 25-44, and 









Table 4.66. Access to Credit from an MFI by Age of Household Head, 2009/10 
(N=2913, Chi-square=9.5159) 
Age Category of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
15-24 121 0.017 
25-44 1480 0.053 
45-64 930 0.047 
65 or older 382 0.021 
 
Table 4.67. Access to Credit from SACCO or Informal Savings Group by Age of 
Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2913, Chi-square=12.6909) 
Age Category of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
15-24 121 0.074 
25-44 1480 0.128 
45-64 930 0.159 
65 or older 382 0.102 
 
Table 4.68. Access to Credit from Friends or Relatives by Age of Household Head, 
2009/10 (N=2913, Chi-square=36.9570) 
Age Category of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
15-24 121 0.273 
25-44 1480 0.286 
45-64 930 0.224 
65 or older 382 0.144 
 
 The 2009/10 data show that female headed households were 0.63, 0.31, and 0.80 
times as likely to access loans from a bank, employer, or friend/relative, respectively, but 
1.58 times more likely to access loans from a credit union. There is no significant 
difference between male and female headed households for access to loans from a 









Table 4.69. Access to Bank Credit by Gender, 2009/10 (N=2918, Chi-square=5.5529) 
Gender  N Proportion 
Female 820 0.037 
Male 2098 0.058 
 
Table 4.70. Access to Credit from a Credit Union by Gender, 2009/10 (N=2918, Chi-
square=2.8192) 
Gender  N Proportion 
Female 820 0.026 
Male 2098 0.016 
 
Table 4.71. Access to Credit from an Employer by Gender, 2009/10 (N=2917, Chi-
square=4.2204) 
Gender N Proportion 
Female 819 0.004 
Male 2098 0.012 
 
Table 4.72. Access to Credit from Friend or Relative by Gender, 2009/10 (N=2918, 
Chi-square=8.3952) 
Gender N Proportion 
Female 820 0.210 
Male 2098 0.261 
 
 Significant differences in credit sources by marital status of the household head 
were found in bank loans, SACCOs and savings groups, and loans from a friend or 
relative. In 2005/06, households whose heads are married monogamously were 2.61, 
1.84, and 1.29 more likely to access bank loans than households where the head is 
divorced/separated, widowed, or never married, respectively, and the difference is even 
greater for polygamous households. The same result is found in 2009/10, but the 
difference is not as great, with households whose head is widowed still 0.41 times as 





However, in 2009, households where the head was never married were 1.12 times more 
likely to access bank credit as households whose head is married monogamously.  
 
Table 4.73. Access to Bank Credit by Marital Status of the Household Head, 2005/06 
(N=902, Chi-square=8.8928) 
Marital Status of Household Head N Proportion 
Married Monogamously 533 0.083 
Married Polygamous 170 0.129 
Divorced/Separated 63 0.032 
Widow/Widower 89 0.045 
Never Married 47 0.064 
 
Table 4.74. Access to Bank Credit by Marital Status of the Household Head, 2009/10 
(N=2912, Chi-square=8.6412) 
Marital Status of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
Married Monogamously 1594 0.059 
Married Polygamous 536 0.052 
Divorced/Separated 276 0.047 
Widow/Widower 415 0.024 
Never Married 91 0.066 
 
 In 2009/10, there was a significant difference in access to SACCO and savings 
group loans. Households whose head is divorced/separated or widowed were 0.68 and 
0.71 times as likely than monogamously married heads of household to access these 
loans, and those whose heads were never married were 0.44 times as likely.  
 
Table 4.75. Access to Credit from a SACCO or Informal Savings Group by Marital 
Status of the Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2912, Chi-square=12.0225) 
Marital Status of Household 
Head 
N Proportion 
Married Monogamously 1594 0.149 
Married Polygamous 536 0.131 
Divorced/Separated 276 0.101 
Widow/Widower 415 0.106 





 While no difference was found for loans from relatives in 2005/06, households 
whose head was never married were 1.54, 1.84, 1.45, and 1.82 times more likely to 
borrow from friends than households whose head is married monogamously, married 
polygamous, divorced/separated, or widow/widower, respectively. The same results were 
found in 2009/10, but the differences are not as great as they were in 2005/06. In 
2009/10, households whose heads are separated/divorced or widowed were 0.85 and 0.77 
times as likely to take a loan from friends or relatives than households whose head is 
married monogamously.  
 
Table 4.76. Access to Credit from Friends by Marital Status of the Household Head, 
2005/06 (N=902, Chi-square=11.5967) 
Marital Status of Head of 
Household 
N Proportion 
Married Monogamously 533 0.360 
Married Polygamous 170 0.300 
Divorced/Separated 63 0.381 
Widow/Widower 89 0.303 
Never Married 47 0.553 
 
Table 4.77. Access to Credit from Friends and Relatives by Marital Status of the 
Household Head, 2009/10 (N=2912, Chi-square=9.7050)  
Marital Status of Head of 
Household 
N Proportion 
Married Monogamously 1594 0.259 
Married Polygamous 536 0.248 
Divorced/Separated 276 0.221 
Widow/Widower 415 0.200 
Never Married 91 0.319 
 
 
 There were no significant differences for credit from friends, relatives, SACCOs, 
or informal savings groups by education level of the household head in 2009/10. No other 





 In 2005/06, there was a significant difference between household size and access 
to credit. Households with only one member were 2.95 and 2.26 more likely to have 
access to bank loans than households with three members or four to five members. 
Households with more than five members were 1.80 and 1.38 times more likely to have 
access to bank loans than households with three members or four to five members, 
respectively and were approximately twice as likely as households with two to five 
members to take a loan from an MFI. Households with five or fewer members were 
between 1.35 and 1.57 times more likely than households with more than five members 
to take a loan from a friend.  
 
Table 4.78. Access to Bank Credit by Household Size, 2005/06 (N=901, Chi-
square=10.8190) 
Household Size N Proportion 
1 58 0.155 
2 49 0.000 
3 76 0.053 
4-5 233 0.069 
>5 485 0.095 
 
Table 4.79. Access to Credit from an MFI by Household Size, 2005/06 (N=901, Chi-
square=13.6149) 
Household Size N Proportion 
1 58 0.138 
2 49 0.082 
3 76 0.066 
4-5 233 0.086 
>5 485 0.167 
 
Table 4.80. Access to Credit from Friend by Household Size, 2005/06 (N=901, Chi-
square=18.0657) 
Household Size N Proportion 
1 58 0.340 





Household Size N Proportion 
3 76 0.461 
4-5 233 0.416 
>5 485 0.293 
 
 Results from 2009/10 show that households of over five were 1.56, 1.49, 4.02, 
and 3.50 times as likely as households with four to five, three, two, or one member, 
respectively, to have access to bank loans. The 2009/10 results also show that households 
with more than five members were 1.15, 1.46, 2.35, and 3.07 times as likely as 
households with four to five, three, two, or one member, respectively, to have access to 
credit from a SACCO or informal savings group.  
 
Table 4.81. Access to Bank Credit by Household Size, 2009/10 (N=2918, Chi-
squared=15.8557) 
Household Size N Proportion 
1 162 0.019 
2 186 0.016 
3 230 0.044 
4-5 673 0.042 
>5 1667 0.065 
  
Table 4.82. Access to Credit from SACCO or Informal Savings Group by 
Household Size, 2009/10 (N=2918, Chi-square=24.2195) 
Household Size N Proportion 
1 162 0.049 
2 186 0.065 
3 230 0.104 
4-5 673 0.132 
>5 1667 0.152 
 
 
Table 4.83. Access to Bank Credit by Rural/Urban Residence, 2005/06 (N=902, Chi-
square=34.2662) 
Rural/Urban N  Proportion 





Rural/Urban N  Proportion 
Urban 273 0.165 
 
 Rural households were 4.37 and 1.74 times more likely than urban households to 
take a loan from an informal group or SACCO in 2005/06 and 2009/10, respectively. 
Urban households were 1.64 and 3.51 times more likely than rural households to take a 
loan from an MFI and 3.45 and 2.96 times as likely to access credit from a bank in 
2005/06 and 2009/10, respectively. In 2009/10, urban households were also 10.46 times 
more likely than rural households to borrow from their employer. 
 
Table 4.84. Access to Bank Credit by Rural/Urban Residence, 2009/10 (N=2918, 
Chi-square=52.1054) 
Rural/Urban N Proportion 
Rural  2167 0.035 
Urban 751 0.103 
 
 
Table 4.85. Access to MFI Credit by Rural/Urban Residence, 2005/06 (N=902, Chi-
square=8.1545) 
Rural/Urban N Proportion 
Rural 629 0.110 
Urban 273 0.180 
 
Table 4.86. Access to Credit from an MFI by Rural/Urban Residence, 2009/10 
(N=2918, Chi-square=61.9545) 
Rural/Urban N Proportion 
Rural 2167 0.028 
Urban 751 0.097 
 
Table 4.87. Access to Credit from Informal Savings Group by Rural/Urban 
Residence, 2005/06 (N=902, Chi-square=33.3568) 
Rural/Urban  N Proportion 
Rural 629 0.192 





Table 4.88. Access to Credit from an Informal Savings Group or SACCO by 
Rural/Urban Residence, 2009/10 (N=2918, Chi-square=19.5137) 
Rural/Urban N Proportion 
Rural 2167 0.149 
Urban 751 0.085 
 
 
Table 4.89. Access to Credit from Employer by Rural/Urban Residence, 2009/10 
(N=2917, Chi-square=41.2680) 
Rural/Urban  N Proportion 
Rural  2166 0.003 
Urban  751 0.029 
 
 The only significant difference in access to credit by household shocks in 2005/06 
was found in informal savings groups. Households who experienced a livestock epidemic 
were 0.56 times as likely to have access to credit from an informal savings group as the 
average household who experienced a shock of any kind; households who experienced a 
fire were 0.64 times as likely; households who experienced civil strife were 0.47 times as 
likely; households who experienced robbery/theft were 0.38 times as likely; and 
households who experienced the death of a family member were 0.72 times as likely as 
the average family who experienced a shock of any kind to have access to credit from an 
informal savings group.  
 
Table 4.90. Access to Credit from Informal Savings Group by Household Shock, 
2005/06 (N=1086, Chi-square=31.4019) 
Type of Household Shock N Proportion 
Drought 362 0.204 
Flood/Hailstorm 156 0.250 
Pest Attack 106 0.179 
Bad Seed Quality 20 0.250 
Livestock Epidemic 53 0.094 
Fire 28 0.107 
Civil Strife 38 0.079 





Type of Household Shock N Proportion 
Death of Household Head 20 0.250 
Death of Family Member 148 0.122 
Injury from Accident 32 0.156 
Other 15 0.000 
Total 1086 0.169 
 
 In 2009/10, the only significant differences found between types of household 
shocks were for credit from friends or relatives. Households who experienced 
drought/irregular rains and theft of money, valuables, or non-agricultural assets were 0.91 
and 0.79 times as likely as the average household that experienced a shock of any kind to 
borrow from friends and relatives.  
 
Table 4.91. Access to Credit from Friends and Relatives by Household Shock, 
2009/10 (N=2647, Chi-square=25.4569) 
Type of Household Shock N Proportion 
Drought/Irregular Rains 1333 0.272 
Floods 62 0.387 
Landslide/Erosion 22 0.409 
Unusually high level of crop 
pest and disease 
136 0.294 
Unusually high level of 
livestock disease 
82 0.342 
Unusually high costs of 
agricultural inputs 
58 0.362 
Unusually low prices for 
agricultural output 
50 0.280 
Reduction in earnings 28 0.464 
Loss of employment 9 0.444 
Serious illness or accident of 
income earner 
188 0.351 
Serious illness or accident of 
other household member 
186 0.290 
Death of income earner 27 0.370 
Death of other household 
member 
73 0.315 
Theft of money, valuables, 






Type of Household Shock N Proportion 
Theft of agricultural assets 
(crops of livestock) 
126 0.373 
Conflict/Violence 34 0.324 
Fire 26 0.423 
Other 101 0.287 
Total  2647 0.299 
 
 Households with assets worth over five million shillings were least likely to 
borrow from an informal savings group in 2005/06. These households were between 
0.344 and 0.172 times as likely as households in other asset value classes to borrow from 
a savings group. Households with assets valued between one and two million shillings 
were between 1.173 and 5.807 times as likely as other households to have access to loans 
from an informal savings group in 2005/06. Households with assets of one million 
shillings or less were 1.513 and 4.403 times as likely to borrow from an informal savings 
group as households with assets between four and five million and households with assets 
of over five million, respectively. Households in the lowest asset value class were also 
between 1.404 and 2.341 times more likely than households with greater assets to borrow 
from a friend. We could not test the credit data by asset type due to low counts.  
 
Table 4.92. Access to Credit from Informal Savings Group by Asset Value, 2005/06 
(N=773, Chi-square=15.3474) 
Asset Value Class N Proportion 
0 to 1 Million  506 0.178 
1 to 2 Million 81 0.235 
2 to 3 Million 35 0.200 
3 to 4 Million 35 0.200 
4 to 5 Million 17 0.118 






Table 4.93. Access to Credit from Friend by Asset Value, 2005/06 (N=773, Chi-
square=26.5227) 
Asset Value Class N  Proportion 
0 to 1 Million  506 0.401 
1 to 2 Million 81 0.222 
2 to 3 Million 35 0.286 
3 to 4 Million 35 0.171 
4 to 5 Million 17 0.177 
More than 5 Million 99 0.222 
 
 Households in the highest asset value class were more likely than households in 
any other asset value class to have access to bank loans or MFI loans in 2009/10. These 
households were between 1.750 and 7.000 times as likely to have access to bank credit as 
households in other asset classes. Households with over five million shillings in assets 
were also between 1.434 and 6.909 times as likely to have access to credit from an MFI 
as other households.  
 Households with assets valued between zero and three million shillings are less 
likely to have access to bank or MFI credit than households with assets greater than three 
million shillings. However, households in the lowest asset value class were not least 
likely in either category; these households were 1.200 times as likely to have access to 
bank credit as households with assets valued between two and three million shillings and 
2.727 times as likely to have access to credit from an MFI as households with assets 
valued between one and two million shillings.  
 
Table 4.94. Access to Bank Credit by Asset Value, 2009/10 (N=2905, Chi-
square=87.7644) 
Asset Value Class N Proportion 
0 to 1 Million  895 0.018 
1 to 2 Million 449 0.029 





Asset Value Class N Proportion 
3 to 4 Million 188 0.053 
4 to 5 Million 151 0.060 
More than 5 Million 951 0.105 
 
Table 4.95. Access to Credit from an MFI by Asset Value, 2009/10 (N=2905, Chi-
square=37.0805) 
Asset Value Class N Proportion 
0 to 1 Million  895 0.030 
1 to 2 Million 449 0.011 
2 to 3 Million 271 0.044 
3 to 4 Million 188 0.053 
4 to 5 Million 151 0.046 
More than 5 Million 951 0.076 
 
 Households with assets of one million shillings or less were least likely to have 
access to loans from a SACCO or savings group in 2009/10, but were more likely than 
any other households to borrow from friends or relatives. Specifically, households in the 
lowest asset value class were between 0.366 and 0.600 times as likely as households in 
all other classes to have access to SACCO or savings group loans. These households 
were between 1.053 and 1.402 times as likely to borrow from friends and relatives.  
 
Table 4.96. Access to Credit from SACCO or Informal Savings Group by Asset 
Value, 2009/10 (N=2905, Chi-square=46.8624) 
Asset Value Class N Proportion 
0 to 1 Million  895 0.075 
1 to 2 Million 449 0.125 
2 to 3 Million 271 0.166 
3 to 4 Million 188 0.138 
4 to 5 Million 151 0.205 








Table 4.97. Access to Credit from Friends and Relatives by Asset Value, 2009/10 
(N=2905, Chi-square=12.4313) 
Asset Value Class N  Proportion 
0 to 1 Million  895 0.279 
1 to 2 Million 449 0.265 
2 to 3 Million 271 0.247 
3 to 4 Million 188 0.245 
4 to 5 Million 151 0.199 
More than 5 Million 951 0.217 
 
 Households whose main income source is subsistence farming, commercial 
farming, or wage employment were 1.04, 1.57, and 1.10 times as likely to take a loan 
from friends or relatives as households whose main source of income comes from any 
other source. Households whose main income is from subsistence farming were 1.20 
times as likely to have access to credit from a SACCO or informal savings group as 
households whose main income comes from any other source.  Households whose main 
income is from remittances were 0.53 and 0.26 times as likely to have access to credit 
from friends/relatives or SACCO/informal savings group, respectively, than households 
whose income comes from other sources. 
 
Table 4.98. Access to Credit from Friend or Relative by Main Source of Household 
Income, 2009/10 (N=2907, Chi-square=29.3112) 
Main Source of Household 
Income 
N Proportion 
Subsistence Farming 1376 0.257 
Commercial Farming 57 0.386 
Wage Employment 637 0.270 
Non-agricultural Enterprise 610 0.223 
Property Income 38 0.158 
Transfers 13 0.000 
Remittances 145 0.131 
Organizational Support 10 0.400 
Other 21 0.143 





Table 4.99. Access to Credit from a SACCO or Informal Savings Group by Main 
Source of Household Income, 2009/10 (N=2907, Chi-square=28.6429) 
Main Source of Household 
Income 
N Proportion 
Subsistence Farming 1376 0.159 
Commercial Farming 57 0.088 
Wage Employment 637 0.122 
Non-agricultural Enterprise 610 0.123 
Property Income 38 0.079 
Transfers 13 0.077 
Remittances 145 0.035 
Organizational Support 10 0.000 
Other 21 0.000 
Total 2907 0.133 
  
 The results show that there are large differences in access to different types of 
financial institutions for different types of households. The next chapter provides a 
summary of these results, discusses some preliminary regression results, and makes 
















SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
This study was conducted to explore the relationship between several household 
characteristics and access to savings and credit from various sources. Household 
characteristics observed were age, gender, marital status, and education level of the 
household head; household size; whether the household resides in a rural or urban 
location; asset ownership and value; types of households shocks experienced; and main 
income source. This chapter summarizes the results and discusses their implications.  
The goal of this research is to answer the question, “Which household 
characteristics contribute to access to savings and credit at various types of financial 
institutions?” Using World Bank panel data collected in Uganda in 2005/06 and 2009/10, 
we conducted a series of chi-squared tests to find significant relationships between the 
household variables and access to financial products at the different institutions. All tests 
used a significance level of 0.05. 
 
5.1 Savings Summary 
 
 
The proportions of households with access to a savings account at a formal 
institution increased slightly from 2005/06 to 2009/10.  
We found many significant differences based on characteristics of the household 
head. Households whose head is between the ages of 15-24, 65 or older, or has less than a 
secondary education were less likely to have access to formal, semi-formal, or informal 





were twice as likely to have access to a savings account at a formal institution than those 
who have not completed secondary school.  
Female headed households were also less likely to have access to a savings 
account at a formal institution, but there was no significant difference at the semi-formal 
or informal level between female and male headed households. This may be because 
female heads of household are more likely than male household heads to get involved in 
community groups and SACCOs, but may not feel comfortable using a formal institution 
for a variety of reasons including illiteracy, lack of trust, or time and cost of going to a 
formal institution.  
The results for marital status of the household head show that households whose 
head is divorced, separated, or widowed were less likely than households whose head is 
married to have access to a savings account at any type of institution. Households whose 
head has never been married were less likely to have a savings account at a semi-formal 
or informal institution, while they were more likely to have access to a formal institution.  
Households with more than five members were more likely than those with five 
or fewer to have access to a savings account at all types of institutions. Urban households 
were more than three times as likely as rural households to have a savings account at a 
formal financial institution and almost twice as likely to have savings with a credit union 
or MFI, while they were less likely than rural households to save with an informal group. 
There were not many large differences in access to savings between types of 
household shocks experienced. The largest difference was for households who 





compared with the average for all households that experienced shocks in both 2005/06 
and 2009/10. This may be because these shocks are more expensive to recover from than 
other household shocks.  
Households that own an asset that may earn them income seem to have more 
access to a savings account, although further research would be necessary to confirm this. 
Households who own a generator, solar panels, a motor vehicle, transport equipment, a 
computer, or a television were more likely to have a savings account than other 
households. Households who own a boat were less likely to have savings at a formal 
institution, but more likely to have savings with an informal savings group. This is likely 
due to the fact that, while a boat is an income generating asset for fishing families, the 
income is typically very low. Households that own a motor vehicle were more likely to 
have savings at a formal institution and less likely to have savings at an informal savings 
group. This may be because households that own a motor vehicle are typically wealthier 
households; however, there may also be households who use the vehicle as a taxi, which 
can earn a large income. Households that own land or a house were less likely to have a 
savings account at any institution.  
In both 2005/06 and 2009/10 households with assets of over five million Uganda 
Shillings (UGX) were the most likely to have access, not only to a formal savings 
account, but to all other categories of savings with a significant result. However, 
households in the lowest asset value class of zero to one million UGX were least likely in 
2005/06. In 2009/10, these households were more likely than households with assets 





with assets of one to two million shillings to have access to savings at a credit union, 
savings association, or MFI. This may be a result of the shift from credit to savings from 
some of these organizations.  
The results show that subsistence farmers were less likely than other households 
to have a savings account with a formal institution, but more likely to save with an 
informal group. This result is consistent with previous findings and is not surprising, 
given the barriers to formal finance that subsistence farmers are faced with. These 
barriers include low and inconsistent income and distance to the institution. The results 
also show that households whose main income source was remittances are less likely than 
other households to have access to formal or informal savings. This result was surprising, 
since some research has found that households who depend on remittances are more 
likely to need and use a savings account to hold their remittance payments. However, if 
these households are extremely poor, they may be using the entirety of these remittance 
payments for living expenses.  
It makes sense to focus linkage programs on households who have less access to 
formal savings accounts. Households who already have access to informal savings 
groups, but no access to formal financial institutions are a good starting point, since they 
are more likely to be financially literate and may have some capital accumulated in 
savings. For example, households whose head has finished at least primary one, but has 
not gone beyond primary seven, and households whose main income source is from 
subsistence farming are good candidates for linkage banking programs, as they are more 





a formal institution. Households who do not have access to informal savings groups 
should also be targeted, but will require more resources for training.  
It is clear from the results of the survey analysis that rural households, households 
with less than six members, and those households whose heads are between the ages of 
15-24, 65 or older, are female, not married, have little or no education, low asset value, or 
depend mainly on subsistence farming, remittances, or organizational support as their 
main source of income are the households that are more financially excluded. All of these 
households should be targeted for linkage banking programs.  
 
5.2 Credit Summary 
 
 
In 2009/10, more loans were taken from informal sources such as relative/friend 
or savings group/SACCO, at 24.67% and 13.23% respectively, than from a bank, with 
only 5.21% of households reporting a loan from this source.  
Households whose head is between the ages of 15-24, 65 and older, female, 
divorced, separated, or widowed, or have little or no education were less likely to have 
access to bank credit. Households whose head is divorced, separated, or widowed were 
also less likely than households whose head is married to access credit from SACCOs or 
informal savings groups, and those whose heads were never married were even less 
likely.  
There was some variation in access to semi-formal and informal sources, with 
households whose head is between the ages of 15-24 less likely to borrow from MFIs, 





These households often consist of orphaned children with one of the older children as the 
head of household. More research should be done to find out why these households are 
excluded from savings groups. Households whose head was never married were also 
more likely to borrow from a friend. These may be some of the same households whose 
heads are between the ages of 15-24 and may reinforce the idea that young households 
are more likely to be excluded from formal finance. These households may be 
particularly vulnerable and should be targeted for linkage banking programs. 
 There were some changes in access to formal credit between 2005/06 and 2009/10 
depending on household size. In 2005/06, households with only one member were twice 
as likely as the average to access bank credit, while households with more than five 
members were twice as likely as the average to take a loan from an MFI. However, the 
2009/10 results show that households with more than five members are more likely than 
other households to take a loan from a bank. This may indicate a trend of greater access 
to commercial banks. More research should be done to see if this trend exists. These 
households were also more likely to take a loan from a SACCO or informal savings 
group.  
 Urban households were three times as likely as rural households to take a loan 
from a commercial bank, but less likely to take a loan from an informal savings group or 
SACCO.   
There were no significant differences in access to formal credit by type of 





 Households in the highest asset value class of more than five million UGX were 
more likely to borrow from banks and MFIs and less likely to borrow from informal 
savings groups, as expected. Households with one million UGX or less in assets tend to 
borrow more from friends and relatives. One surprising result is that these low asset value 
households decreased their borrowing from informal savings groups from 2005/06 to 
2009/10. It is possible that they are borrowing less overall.  
 The results show that subsistence farmers were more likely than many other 
households to access credit from friends, relatives, SACCOs, and informal savings 
groups. Households who depend on remittance payments as their main income source 
were less likely to access credit from friends, relatives, SACCOs, or informal savings 
groups compared to other households. These results are not surprising, since households 
that receive remittance payments were less likely to need access to additional funds.  
 The recommendations in terms of credit were similar to those of savings. The 
target groups for linkage banking programs should be rural households, subsistence 
farmers, and households whose head is between the ages of 15-24, 65 or older, female, 
divorced, separated, or widowed. In terms of household size, households with fewer than 
six members should be targeted, with the only difference being single member 
households. Households with one member were already more likely than other 
households to have access to bank credit. Demand for credit from households of size two 
to five and households whose head is between the ages of 15-24 is demonstrated by a 
greater likelihood of borrowing from friends and family, while they are less likely to have 





value class should also be targeted, but may benefit more from the savings aspect of the 
program and may only benefit from credit after having time to build up capital and asset 
value.  
 
5.3 Discussion and recommendations 
 
 
 Our study results are consistent with previous studies, but also provide a more 
detailed picture of financial access by looking at institution type. We see that rural 
households are using informal savings groups for both savings and credit, but are less 
likely to have access to formal institutions. This is in line with the design of CARE’s 
linkage banking program, which begins with an informal savings group and connects that 
group to the formal bank after a training period.  
 More specifically, households whose heads are young, single, or female should be 
the primary targets of linkage banking programs. Young households may not have strong 
community ties and may need assistance in joining a local savings group, whereas female 
headed households may already have strong community ties, but may need assistance in 
connecting to the bank.  
 More research should be done on the impact of the CARE linkage banking 
program, as we are seeing a slight increase in formal bank access, but we do not have 
enough information to conclude that it is a result of the program. A study should be done 
at the household or village level, using villages or households with access to the CARE 
linkage banking program as the treatment and comparing to villages or households 





 The next steps for this research would be to do a regression analysis to look at the 
relationships between variables in more detail and to identify any interactions between 
the variables. 
Initial regression results show that access to a formal savings account decreases as 
age increases. Our chi-square results show that access to formal savings accounts is 
greater for households whose head has finished some secondary school or higher 
education and that access to informal savings groups is greater for those whose household 
head has completed some primary school. The regression results allow us to look at these 
relationships in more detail. Initial regression results for education show that households 
whose head has completed any level of primary school or secondary one are less likely to 
have access to a formal savings account; households whose head have completed post 
primary training or certificate, senior two, or senior four are more likely to have access to 
a formal savings account; and that households whose head has completed senior six, post 
secondary training or diploma, or a college degree are even more likely to have access to 
a formal savings account. Initial regression results for access to informal savings groups 
show that households whose head completed primary three, primary six, primary seven, 
post primary training or certificate, senior one, senior four, or post secondary training or 
diploma are more likely to have access to savings at an informal savings group. These 






The regression results show that access to savings at a formal institution or an 
informal savings group increase as the household size increases, which is also consistent 
with our chi-square results.  
The chi-square results show that rural households are less likely than urban 
households to have access to a savings account or credit at a formal institution and more 
likely than urban households to have access to savings or credit at an informal savings 
group. These results are the same when we run the regression analysis. A full regression 
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